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CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION 
Currently, a major policy question and an on-going 
debate exists concerning the use of industrial revenue 
bonds. IRBs are financial incentives issued by the govern-
ment to attract firms to specific locations. The interest 
on the bond is exempt from federal income taxes, so in-
terest rates on the loans are several points below con-
ventional rates. The federal government has threatened to 
eliminate IRBs completely, despite the existence of a 
large coalition of supporters. A crucial policy decision 
such as this deserves careful scrutiny. The usefulness of 
bonds cannot be examined exclusively in terms of an overall 
general framework. Each of the methods that have been 
applied to the bonds' functioning must be given careful 
consideration, in order to determine if any useful 
variations ex ist. One such possibility is the Massachusetts 
Commercial Area Revitalization District Program (CARD) 
which utilizes IRBs in a specific way: To target growth 
into distressed areas of cities and towns. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if a justi-
fiable use for revenue bonds ex ists. The specific question 
to be answered is this: "Does the CARD Program justify the 
use of revenue bonds by achieving its goal of revitaliza-
tion?" This question can be broken down into three sub-
parts: 
(1) Is the CARD Program achieving its stated goals? 
(2) Are revenue bonds a major tool in the success of 
the program? 
( 2 ) 
(J) Do the program's stated goals improve upon the 
functioning of revenue bonds? 
If it can be proven that these three questions can be 
answered in the affirmative, then a justified use for IRBs 
ex ists, and the federal government must reassess its pro-
posal for their complete elimination. 
A detailed background of IRBs is presented to highlight 
the heated controversy that presently exists. Next, a 
chronology of the emergence of the CARD Program indicates 
the origins of the program's goals. This section provides 
the background on which to determine whether or not the 
specific application of IRBs to achieve CARD's goals era-
dicates the many problems that have previously been cited 
in using the bonds. 
The third chapter explains the program's rules and 
regulations, and how the program is actually administered. 
The fourth chapter presents empirical evidence, 
collected through a survey of cities and towns with 
approved CARD plans. This section examines whether or not 
the CARD program is achieving its stated goals, and assesses 
the actual and perceived success of the program. 
Finally, the conclusion concretely states how CARD's 
use of revenue bonds is or is not eliminating the drawbacks 
of IRBs. Recommendations are suggested for the future use 
of bonds, in addition to steps that must be taken before the 
federal government makes this serious decision concerning 
the elimination of the tax-exempt status of IRBs. 
(J) 
CHAPTER II: 
INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS 
Early History 
In the first 100 years of our country's history, public 
works projects were financed either privately or through 
the issuance of the full faith and credit obligation of 
the State. By 1850 the unsatisfactory financial record 
of state-backed public improvements, railroads, canals, 
and toll roads caused concern and controversy; thus 
many states passed laws prohibiting the pledge of state 
or local credit for such projects. 
As a result, cities devised the concept of revenue 
bonds, which is based on the theory that potential 
customers of the service should incur the costs accrued 
to provide that service. Therefore revenue bonds could 
be used in lieu of increased municipal taxation. 
The first municipal revenue bonds issued in the 
United States were offered in Spokane, Washington in the 
early 1890's. They were certificates payable exclusively 
from the revenues of the city's waterworks. At that 
time, there was no legislation governing the issuance of 
revenue bonds, and the city established through the 
courts that revenue certificates could be issued because 
they did not constitute a direct and general obligation of 
the city. It became apparent that legislation was needed 
to govern revenue bond financing, so in 1897 the State of 
Washington authorized the issuance of special revenue 
bonds. Subsequently municipalities effected large-scale 
(5) 
revenue bond financing of waterworks, power and light 
systems, and street railways. 
This example set the precedent for other states to 
follow, and by the 1920's they were used throughout the 
country to finance various public works projects. Since 
the interest on municipal bonds is exempt from federal 
income taxes (upheld in the case of McCulloch vs. Maryland), 
local governments are able to borrow funds in the capital 
markets at interest rates lower than those available to 
private borrowers. 
During the 19JO's the federal government encouraged 
states to create public housing authorities and allow the 
issuance of revenue bonds in order to ease the demand for 
housing. Federal government agencies purchased the bonds, 
acted as underwriters, and resold them to private investors. 
During WWII the use of revenue bonds eased up, since very 
few public works projects were undertaken. After the war 
however, large flotations of revenue bonds began again, 
due to pent up demand for services. 
Most states have statutes to control the issuance of 
revenue bonds. They stipulate that the bonds do not 
enjoy the full faith and credit and taxing power of the 
government; they are not general obligations of the 
issuing governmental units; and the interest and principal 
will only be paid from revenues earned by the project. 
The first industrial aid bond was issued in the State 
of Mississippi in 1936 . Au t h ority for the issu e came from 
(6) 
the State's "Balance Agriculture with Industry" (BAWI) 
plan which was legislatively approved, and made industrial 
aid financing available to all Mississippi communities. 
This effort came in the midst of the Great Depression, 
when southern states were feeling the affects of the 
Industrial Revolution through their depressed agricultural 
economy. They witnessed the surging growth of their 
northern rivals, and devised this medium to equalize 
competition and eventually lead to their economic diversifi-
cation and rejuvenation. This state program enabled 
municipalities to sell tax exempt bonds to purchase sites 
and construct industrial facilities. The facilities could 
then be leased to private firms for a period of time 
sufficient for rental payments to cover principal and 
interest on the bonds. Should the tenant default, he 
would be subject to eviction. These industrial development 
bonds are of the general obligation type, which pledge the 
credit and taxing power of the issuer (the government). 
Therefore their interest rate is lower than revenue bonds 
and they are more attractive to the private firm, hence 
more easily marketed. 
The rationale for this use is that bonds will act as 
catalysts to attract industry that will in turn absorb 
labor surpluses and rejuvenate dying communities. As new 
industry grows, payrolls increase which bring greater 
retail sales and services, property values rise, and the 
area progresses toward full development. 
( 7) 
Little attention was paid to industrial development 
financing until 1951 when Greenville, Mississippi sold 
2i% Industrial General Obligation (Development) Bonds for 
a well known carpet manufacturer. The Investment Bankers 
Association took its stand on November 29, 1951. It 
read as follows: 
Whereas, the legislatures in some states have 
recently enacted laws authorizing municipalities 
to construct or acquire manufacturing or indus-
trial plants for the express purpose of leasing 
such plants to private corporations or indivi-
duals and to finance such construction or ac-
quisition by the issuance of revenue or general 
obligation bonds of such municipalities payable 
solely or primarily from the rentals of such 
plants; and 
Whereas, similar practices in the past have 
had injurious effects upon public credit; and 
Whereas, if this practice is unchecked it 
may react to the detriment of our present 
system of free economy and further may ultimate-
ly endanger the valuable position ~f state 
sovereignty as part of our constitutional dual 
system of government; now therefore 
Be it resolved, that the IBA of America in 
convention assembled recommends to its members 
and to dealers generally: 
First, that each take it upon himself to 
become thoroughly informed on this whole 
development and exercise extreme caution in 
underwriting or marketing such bonds; and 
Second, that each use his best efforts to 
inform voters, state legislators, prospective 
issuing units of local governments, and other 
interested parties of the past experience and 
inherent d1ngers of public financing of this 
character. 
Thus the beginning of the controversy over industrial 
development bond financing . 
(8) 
Judicial Decisions 
Questions concerning the constitutionality of issuing 
bonds for these purposes can be traced through the history 
of court opinion on the subject. In 1875, the U.S. Supreme 
Court heard the case of Citizens Savings and Loan Associa-
tion vs. Topeka, which questioned the use of municipal 
bonds to aid industry. The city issued bonds to attract 
an iron works to Topeka. The company defaulted, and the 
bank claimed that the city was liable. The court held 
that in order for the bonds to be paid, funds would have 
to come through taxation. But taxes could only be levied 
for a public purpose which this wasn't, so the bonds were 
declared void. The court defined "public purpose" very 
narrowly, which has been the major issue in this type of 
case. A dissenting opinion stated that a federal court 
could not adjudge a state statute void unless it conflicted 
with some provision of the Constitution of the United 
States or of the State. 2 This statement wasn't complied 
with until the end of the nineteenth century, when the 
court adopted a broader interpretation of the function of 
state government. In the case of Jones vs. Portland 
(245 U.S. 217, 62 L.Ed. 252 (1917)), the opinion of the 
Court said in part that: 
While the ultimate authority to determine 
the validity of legislation under the Four-
teenth Amendment is rested in this Court, 
local conditions are of such varying character 
that what is or is not a public use in a 
particular state is manifestly a matter re-
specting wh ich local authority, legislative 
( 9) 
and judicial, has peculiar facilities for 
securing accurate information. In that view 
the judgement of the highest court of the 
State upon what should be deemed a public 
use in a particular state is entitled to the 
highest respect (62 L.Ed. 878 (1920) p. 255). 
In Green vs. Farzier (253 U.S. 233, 64 L. Ed. 878 
(1920)), state legislation was questioned that authorized 
capital for businesses to come from bond issues which 
pledged the full faith and credit of the state (general 
obligation bonds; industrial development bonds). The 
Court reiterated its stand that public monies could only be 
used for public purposes, but left this determination to 
the state. The case of Carmichael vs. Southern Coal and 
Coke Company (301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245 (1937)), 
involved a landmark decision on the question of tax monies 
spent for the welfare of individuals rather than the 
community at large. This was adjudged to be in the public 
interest: 
Expenditure of public funds under the pre-
sent statute for relief of unemployment, will 
afford some protection to a substantial group 
of employees, and we cannot say that this is 
not for a public purpose . 
. . . When public evils ensue from individual 
misfortunes or needs, the legislature may 
strike at the evil of its source (81 L. Ed. 
p. 1256) . 
In 1938 the constitutionality of Mississippi's BAWI Act 
was questioned in the case of Albritton vs. City of Winoma. 
The act was upheld by the State Supreme Court. The appeal 
was taken to the U.S. Supreme Court and dismissed without 
an opinion, on the grounds that there was no federal 
(10) 
question. This was the last time a case involving indus-
trial development financing was brought in the U.S. 
Supreme Court (181 Mississippi 1975, 178 So. 799, 115 A. LR. 
1436 Appeal dismissed per/curriam, JOJ U.S. 627, 82 L. Ed. 
1088 ( 1938)). 
IDBs have caused little difficulty in federal courts 
for they easily satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Not so at the state level, since the borrowing 
and taxing powers of the state must conform to the public 
service doctrine, and public funds may not be used to aid 
a private party. These obstacles were overcome in 
Mississippi in 1938 in the case just cited, when the state 
court stressed that a constitution could not be a static 
document; it had to change as times and conditions 
dictated. The court reasoned that: 
(1) ... It is the duty of government to 
provide for the needs of the poor and to 
relieve unemployment. 
(2) ... No one can deny that the govern-
ment has authority to do this by the direct 
use of tax funds to furnish food and shelter 
in kind or money to buy these necessities. 
( J) ... The state can also accomplish this 
same purpose indirectly by providing employ-
ment. 
(4) ... Can the state and municipality not 
engage the assistance of private industry to 
operate the municipally-owned plant, i.e., 
can it not use private industry as a means to 
a public end? 3 
Kentucky's revenue bond act was upheld by the State 
Court of Appeals (313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W. 2d. 8 0 (1950)), 
( 11) 
but a discussion of public purpose was avoided by recogniz-
ing that revenue bonds do not constitute a use of municipal 
money or taxing power. The use of a city's name and the 
performance of services as a trustee was not a loan of 
credit. 
Favorable state court decisions have followed the 
precendents set in these two cases, but there have been 
decisions opposing industrial development programs. A 
Florida court held that a proposed revenue bond issue was 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the state constitution 
prohibited the lending of public credit for private use 
(State vs. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d. 779 (1952)). 
The Court did not address the fact that revenue bonds do 
not involve a municipal liability or tay since they are 
not a full faith obligation. A Nebraska decision, which 
was overridden in 1960 by a constitutional amendment, 
stated that allowing revenue bonds for industrial develop-
ment involved "fundamental fallacies of reasoning" which 
would hinder the private enterprise system and eliminate 
the constitution's protection of private enterprise (State 
ex. rel. Beck vs. City of York, 194 Neb. 223, 82 N.W. 2d 
269, ( 1957)). 
State court arguments have been very similar across 
the country, although the question of cause and effect is 
still debated. Decisions have continuously resulted from 
those points the particular court chose to emphasize; 
either public funds aiding private enterprise or private 
( 12) 
enterprise benefitting the community. 
Controversy and Policy Changes 
Of all government-sponsored plans to aid industry, IDB 
financing has become the most popular type of state and 
local industrial financing. Prior to 1963, most bonds 
were issued for small companies to whom conventional 
sources were not readily available. The volume of IRBs 
was low and mostly used by southern states. Today, however, 
many companies are supposedly in a cost-price squeeze that 
necessitates every possible cost reduction. 
The general exemption of all state and local interest 
represents a political compromise of a constitutional 
issue, and has been under continual attack since its 
inception in 1913. The federal treasury has consistently 
opposed it on the grounds of tax equity and revenue loss. 
Widespread debate flares periodically, caused in large 
part by the allowance of intergovernmental immunity to be 
enjoyed directly by nongovernmental parties i.e., bond-
holders as ultimate recipients of tax exempt interest. 
Although Treasury has historically opposed the tax 
exemption for interest on all state and local securities 
and does not liberally interpret the intergovernmental 
exemption, a contradictory policy was adopted by the 
Internal Revenue Service in their first publically promul-
gated policy statement (Rev. Ruling 54-106; 1954 CB 28). 
This tax policy specifically e x empted industrial revenue 
bonds from tax es, by defining "obligations of a political 
(13) 
subdivision" to include bonds issued by a municipality with 
the only backing being the revenues generated from leasing 
the property. This public ruling set forth a very liberal 
policy in view of prior Treasury policy and of concurrent 
Congressional efforts in 1954 to remove the interest 
exemption from all state and local obligations. 4 
The next public ruling in the expansion of policy 
definition came in 1957 (Rev Ruling 57-187, 1957-1 CB 24), 
when it was held that interest on bonds issued by an 
independent development board on behalf of a municipality 
would be exempt. Thus the intergovernmental immunities 
exemption was extended to nonprofit groups, which facili-
tated local governmental financing by alternative methods. 
The final liberal interpretation in 1963 (Rev Rule 
63-20) was made by extending the previous policy to 
include specific criteria by which to determine when the 
issuance of bonds would be on behalf of a municipality: 
The municipality must have a beneficial 
interest in the corporation while its bonds 
are outstanding; and the bonds issued by the 
corporation must be approved by the state or 
municipality, even though the corporation's 
creation and objectives were previously 
authorized.5 
It is apparent that this ruling is aimed at those who 
abuse the law, and not designed to affect those who 
operate within it. 
Revenue Rule 63-20 was the vehicle for expansion of 
the tax exempt industrial financing activity. Through this 
medium the means was available for every state to issue 
( 14) 
' 
them. Competition between states for industry was no 
longer impeded by differences in constitutional and 
statutory authority. With the classification issue 
resolved, substantial growth followed from 1963 to 1968 
in the number of states participating, the size and volume 
of issues, and the number of large national companies 
utilizing tax-exempt IDB financing. 6 
On hindsight the liberal policy of IRS toward interest 
exemption was classed by former Treasury policymakers as 
an administrative error.7 Therefore, in 1968 Treasury 
proposed a reversal of policy and a revocation of the tax-
exempt interest. Congress exercised ultimate authority to 
set tax policy and reached a compromise between opposing 
views. The culmination was a severe restriction of the 
scope of allowable tax-free IDB financing (Section 103, 
IRC of 1954 as amended by Section 107 of PL 96-364 and 
Section 401(a) of PL 90-634). 
The initial legislation amending IRC Section 103 
removed all IDBs from exemption, e xcept for: (1) certain 
"small issues''; (2) specified ex empt activities, and (3) 
industrial parks. Those specifically exempt included 
activities such as residential housing for family units, 
sports facilities, convention facilities, industrial 
transportation (including docks, wharves, grain handling 
and storage, port facilities, and airport facilities), 
sewage and air or water pollution control facilities, 
facilities for supplying local gas or electricity, and 
(15) 
manufacturer's distribution centers. These must satisfy a 
"public use" to be eligible, which at a minimum includes 
being open or available to the general public. This 
definition is up to the discretion of the "exempt issuer" 
(government) and is governed by local statutes. 
"Small issues" refers to the tax exempt limit on 
size and volume, which seeks to assist small businesses 
without other means of financing, and to prevent subsidation 
of large companies who don't need it. The Revenue Expendi-
ture and Control Act of 1968 set the original limits on the 
size of the issuance at a $1 million ceiling. Legislation 
was amended to a $5 million cap, which includes the 
capital e xpenditures made three years before and after 
the bond is issued. Thus, large high cost projects are 
e ycluded. A 1978 amendment increased the issue and 
e xpenditure limit to $10 million, and granted a special 
exception for expenditure rules when used in conjunction 
with Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs). (Capital 
e xpenditure limit increased to $20 million, with bond 
amount still limited to $10 million.) 
The 1968 legislation expressly brought the taxation 
and e x emption of interest on IDB financing within the 
purview of tax policy as conventionally developed in the 
l egislative and administrative processes. 
Prior to 1968 IDB financing was treated as a municipal 
securities offering and exempted from regulation under the 
securities laws. Th e substantial volume of IDB financing 
( 16) 
by large national industrial firms caused the Securities 
Exchange Com.mission (SEC) to question the basis on which 
the issues were exempted from securities regulation. So 
in 1968 the SEC issued an administrative ruling requiring 
certain industrial revenue bond issues over $JOO,OOO to 
be fully registered with the Commission and to conform to 
the rules and regulations applicable to any corporate 
security. General obligation oonds, however, were not 
subject to the new procedure. This represents an indirect 
approach to regulation 0£ the IRB, rather than attacking 
municipal exemption. 
Specifically excluded . from the new controls are bond 
issues covering public projects or facilities owned and 
operated by or on behalf of a governmental unit. These 
include the typical revenue bond financing of college 
facilities, hospitals, port authorities, toll bridges, etc. 
In general, it appears that the exemption from the defini-
tion of a security interest is roughly parallel with the 
tax exemption of IDB issues for certain specified activi-
t . 8 ies. 
A full SEC registration requires additional costs as 
well as an extended time period, which tends to make them 
prohibitive to small firms in particular, and less attrac-
tive in general. Large denomination IDBs are no longer as 
appealing to tax conscious investors or buyers of municipal 
bonds. Nor have small firms seen fit to rely on IDBs as 
they did before, because the new costs tend to offset the 
(17) 
savings from a lower interest rate. 
In combination, the Congressional and SEC restrictions 
have severely curtailed the use of IDBs. No longer is the 
interest rate differential between corporate bonds and 
large-denomination IDBs a significant cost reducing factor.9 
The IDB subsidy as initially constructed failed the test 
of consistency with similar investment subsidies because 
of the absence of control over or limitation on its availa-
bility and use. Lack of control is traceable to the origin 
of the subsidy as an unintended benefit automatically 
arising from intergovernmental immunity rather than as a 
directly initiated tax policy. The 1968 legislative and 
administrative restrictions established a consistent 
investment subsidy policy in the tax law. 
Pros/Cons 
The explosion of IRBs represents a continuing shift 
of tax exempt securities away from their traditional use 
in financing local government improvements such as roads, 
sewers and schools. (See Table 1) This spectacular 
growth and alternative usage has made the bonds immensely 
controversial. The paramount questions underlying the 
debate are: What constitutes a "public purpose"? Are 
bonds achieving this end? Do total "benefits" outweigh 
the costs borne by the general public? 
IDB financing has drawn severe criticism on several 
counts and from diverse sources. The American Bankers 
Association, along with the Investment Bankers Association, 
( 18) 
...... 
'° 
TABLE 1 
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS1 CHANGING USES 
(billions of dollars) 
1960 1970 1975 1977 
Education $2.3 $5.0 $4.7 $5 .1 
Transportation 1.3 3.2 2.2 2.9 
Water and sewerage (government) 1. 0 2.4 2.3 3.3 
Pollution control (industry) -- -- 2.2 2.6 
Hospitals NA NA 2.0 3.3 
Single-family housing NA NA NA 1.0 
Oth er housing* 0.4 0.1 0.6 2.7 
Industrial aid -- 0.1 1.2 2.3 
Utilities (power,gas,transit) 0.3 1.1 2.7 4.8 
Other** 1. 7 5.6 13.4 18.7 
Total $7.1 $17.5 $31.3 $46.7 
*Includes single-family housing before 1977. 
**Includes heavy refunding--more than $10 billion--in 1977 and 1978. 
SOURCES: Municipal Finance Officers Association, CBO. 
1978 1979 
$5.0 $5.1 
3.5 2.4 
3.2 3.1 
2.7 2.1 
2.3 3.4 
3.2 7.2 
2.9 2.6 
3.5 7.0 
5.8 5.4 
19 .5 10.3 
$51.6 $48.7 
Samuelson Robert. "IRBs - Economic Boon or Public Ripoff?" National Journal, 
18 October 1980, p. 1749. 
has taken an official stand against IDBs. Both maintain 
that IDBs are a misuse of a governmental right for a 
private purpose; and therefore pose a threat to the tax 
exempt status of all state and municipal bonds. Critics 
fear that if such issues continue to grow, the U.S. 
Supreme Court may choose to question what constitutes a 
"public purpose" and impose severe restrictions upon state 
and local governments. The . two associations also feel 
that the sale of IDBs drains the pool of investment money 
available for local public projects, thus fractionally 
increasing interest rates on "legitimate" municipal bond 
issues. 
A major objection to IDB financing is that companies 
built through this method have an unfair advantage over 
those that are not. The counter argument states that this 
does not hold for established businesses within the 
community, unless the incoming plant will compete with it. 
It is recognized that if an unfair increase in competition 
does result, the financing should not be undertaken. 
Economists say that the luring of industries by IDBs: 
(1) leads to inferior resource allocation because firms 
will be induced to locate in communities where they would 
not otherwise go; (2) attracts unstable firms that will 
continually relocate to find the best deal; (J) interferes 
with the migration of labor from areas of low productivity 
to areas of hi gh productivity and better social and cul-
tural opportunities; and (4) constitutes an inappropriate 
(20) 
solution to the unemployment problem compared to the gains 
which can be achieved through upgrading education levels, 
10 job training programs, etc. 
It is ar~ued that when a municipal industrial aid 
program is at work, a taYable private entity is not payin~ 
its fair share, and its costs must be absorbed elsewhere. 
But others ar~ue that this contention ignores the newly 
created taYable values and spinoffs from the subsidized 
company. 
The AFL-CIO opposes IDBs on the grounds that they 
induce companies to move from unionized areas into low-wage 
"right-to-work" states. The company does not expand, but 
rather substitutes one facility for another. When this 
happens the economy is not served; no new jobs are created. 
The U.S. Treasury's opposition to the federal tax -
exemption for IDBs is the concern over the loss of tax 
revenues via this loophole, which exceeds the subsidy to 
the borrower. They feel that if amounts to a "federal 
subsidy to private corporations", and the benefits to 
industry are achieved only at the eypense of a loss of 
11 federal tax revenues." According to bonds consultant 
John Thompson, " ... As long as IRB issuance was largely 
confined to small issues for small or modest-sized com-
panies in states with economic resources well below 
averag e, it could be tolerated in our market because the 
volume was inconsequential in relation to total tax -exempt 
. "12 issues ... 
(21) 
One of the most vocal critics is Ralph Nader whose 
organization published a report in September of 1979 
attacking all forms of tax-exempt financing. His report 
asserted that IRBs will cost the U.S. Treasury some $10 
million over the next 10 years in lost revenues. 13 
Although these viewpoints generate strong arguments 
for reducing the use of IRBs, some contain false impres-
sions that are not often addressed. 
Evidence does not support the AFL-CIO's contention 
that IDBs are responsible for firms moving out of unionized 
areas to escape collective bargaining. Most facilities 
that use IDBs are branch production facilities representing 
net additions to plant capacity - not the relocation of an 
existing facility. They often do locate in non-union 
areas, but this is due to available labor, raw materials, 
14 
etc. 
The community's ability to build public facilities is 
more often enhanced by their issuing of IRBs rather than 
impaired. The new jobs generated broaden the tax base and 
strengthen the community's ability to pay off obligations. 
Credit ratings are rarely impaired because revenue bonds 
are most often used, which are subject to a rigorous 
credit examination. 
It is argued that the IRB system benefits those small 
depressed areas of our country seeking employment and 
income for their citizens. According to M. Pratt, "this 
argument may have had some justification JO years ago. The 
(22) 
majority of recent IDBs have benefitted the big powerful 
companies and larger affluent communities." 15 This protest 
is heard most often from the eastern and midwestern com-
munities seeking new industry. Prior to 1965 when most 
firms using IDBs were small and considered unattractive, 
complaints were mild. But when name firms began to con-
struct multi-million dollar plants in southern states, the 
resistence to IDBs became loud, clear and organized. Sud-
denly, the negative aspects of IDBs surfaced. 
The literature is full of bonds being critisized and 
their weaknesses highlighted in an attempt to curb their 
use. Proponents do not often publicize counterattacks 
since bonds are firmly in place and have always had strong 
support. The meritorious aspects that have in the past 
been ignored or improperly perceived must be balanced 
against the arguments just posed, in order to give equal 
weight to both sides. 
When new industry locates in a community, jobs are 
created which were not previously available. Not only is 
manpower needed to construct the plant, but citizens must 
be trained and employed to operate the facility. 
A new plant inevitably means increased commercial 
activity in the area. Jobs bring new incomes; new incomes 
cause demand to increase, especially in home construction. 
Complementary facilities are needed for the primary firm 
and its employees. In an undeveloped area, it may provide 
stimulus for new industry, shopping centers, recreational 
(2J) 
facilities, etc. 
Some areas and communities in the United States will 
always be relatively underdeveloped and deficient in 
essential public services. They suffer unemployment in 
spite of extra efforts to upgrade education and skills. 
When this happens, localities can use IDBs to recruit 
industry and jobs. They can be an effective and relatively 
inexpensive weapon for local economic growth and development. 
When firms are recruited with IDBs, the need for more 
state and federal assistance to combat low incomes at the 
local level is greatly diminished. While federal tax 
revenues are lost through exemption "loopholes", government 
expenditures will also be smaller because unemployment 
problems will be less acute. 
Therefore from this perspective it is reasonable to 
conclud~ that the social and economic benefits of greater 
production, more jobs, higher per capita income, more 
taxable income, and balanced economic growth may offset, 
to a large degree, the real disadvantages of IDBs cited 
above. 
A second aspect of IDBs which has gone unnoticed is 
that they satisfy the preferences of people who would 
rather remain in a given community provided they can find 
employment. Jobs created with IDBs help diminish involun-
tary out-migration. Areas with high rates of unemployment 
and depressed retailing and service enterprises are often 
eag er for new industry. In a liberal s ociety t h ese prefer-
(24) 
ences of individuals and local communities, unless clearly 
against the vital interests of society as a whole, must be 
respected; moreover, public policy should be responsive 
t th . d . 16 o e1r es1res. 
It may not be unreasonable to consider the "legitimate" 
disadvantages of IDBs as simply part of the price that 
society must pay for achieving balanced regional economic 
growth. IDBs are quite consistent with the precepts of 
freedom of choice, local self-help, providing for a 
minimum standard of living for all members of society, 
and overall economic development. 
IRBs' Effect on Location Decisions and Employment Levels 
The debate over the proper use of revenue bonds un-
doubtedly will continue, given its complicated and contra-
versial nature. One possible way of abating the strength 
of either side is to present facts that will prove whether 
or not IRBs are achieving what they are intended to do. 
Are they affecting location decisions of industry, which in 
turn is e xpected to increase net employment? The following 
section will focus on past surveys and studies that attempt 
to answer this question. But first, an overview of 
general location theory is presented that indicates how a 
firm, theoretically, chooses its location. 
Most industrial location theories treat patterns of 
contemporary manufacturing in a nineteenth century frame-
work - transport costs are strongly emphasized and a 
static vi ewpoint is adopted. These traditional approaches 
(25) 
seek to find the optimal location for an industry or firm. 
Two themes are dominent in the literature: the least cost 
approach, associated with Weber, and the market area 
approach, associated with L~sch. The former assumes entre-
preneurs choose a site where costs, such as transportation, 
labor and agglomoration/deglomoration costs, are minimized. 
It is totally concerned with costs; demand is assumed to 
be constant. The latter sees the optimum location where 
the largest possible market is monopolized; where sales 
and revenue potential are maximized. It is totally con-
cerned with demand, leaving costs constant. Both can be 
critisized for their unrealistic assumptions and closed 
static viewpoints. 
There are numerous elements that influence the choice 
of a site. Some are: source of raw materials, transporta-
tion costs, energy, labor supply, unionization, capital, 
and entrepreneurial attitudes. The ideal manufacturing 
area would provide four essential requirements: raw 
materials, a source of energy, labor and a market. 17 But 
since ideal requirements rarely exist, an individual choice 
must be made as to which are most important. Theoretical 
discussions assume that entrepreneurs strive to max imize 
their profits by making thoroughly rational locational 
decisions. This assumption is debated by the contention 
that the non-economic or personal motiv es exert considera-
ble influence on decision-making . 
Des pite the difficulties in attaining a satisfactory 
(26) 
explanation of industrial locative forces, some common 
forces must be at work since there seems to be a theme to 
industrial patterns. A start can be made by comparing 
real world patterns with the abstract landscapes of the 
location theorists, or by examining case examples of indi-
vidual industries and the decision-making behind their 
site choice. With the decrease in importance of traditional 
economic factors like transport costs, the real world 
industrial landscape becomes exceedingly complex to in-
terpret. 
To assess the effectiveness of the program, it is 
important to know just how effective industrial revenue 
bonds are in influencing firms' location and expansion 
decisions. Unfortunately research in this area has been 
contradictory. Some surveys have shown that bonds are a 
critical factor in decisions about location and investment 
for many firms. 18 Other surveys and evaluations of the 
effects of bonds on firms' costs have found that bonds 
never entered firms' choices among states or among particu-
lar sites. When the bonds influenced decisions, these were 
intraregional choices, among similar sites, sometimes 
across state lines. 19 The bonds almost never affected 
expansion decisions at an old site; the level of expansion 
would have been close to the same without the bonds. 20 
A survey of 5,000 companies in seven southern states 
was conducted in the early 1960 1 s to determine those 
factors considered important by management in locating 
(27) 
new or expanding industrial facilities. Information derived 
from the 1,180 responses to the questionnaire in this study 
indicates that: 
(1) traditional factors of markets, labor and raw 
materials are as important today as ever in 
influencing industrial location; 
(2) temporary taY relief has little or no influence 
upon the final decision if management is loo~ing 
for a permanent location; 
(J) industry will locate in those areas wherein 
management foresees opportunities for substantial 
profit. (See Table 2). 
Influences of a secondary nature were found to be of 
considerable consequence in the final selection of a loca-
tion. These include non-economic factors such as the poli-
tical environment, community facilities, and a genuine 
spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm in assisting new firms 
to become a vital part of the community. Normally, these 
secondary forces are not consciously considered until after 
a general geographic area has been selected. 21 
Conclusions from an empirical analysis done by Hellman, 
et.al., in 1975 show: (1) that a revenue bond program is 
the most effective kind of program to increase net invest-
ment in the area; (2) among industries, there appears to 
be a trade-off between growth potential and ability to solve 
immediate unemployment problems; (J) in Massachusetts 
those areas that need help the most participate very little 
in efforts to attract industry. 22 Thus, it is necessary 
for policymakers to define the purpose of industrial incen-
tive programs and to design and implement the program 
(28) 
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Total 
Mention 
Rank 
2 
3 
1 
5 
8 
12 
9 
4 
6 
14 
10 
7 
11 
16 
15 
13 
First 
Place 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
13 
15 
16 
TABLE 2 
FACTORS LISTED IN FIRST PLACE AS INFLUENCING 
CHOICE OF LOCATION 
Reasons for Plant Location 
Convenience to markets 
Availability of bldgs. or other property 
Availability of labor 
Availability of raw material 
Home of management 
Center of particular industry 
Climate 
Lower labor costs 
Less unionization 
Decentralization of operation 
Transportation costs 
• 
Local cooperativeness 
Adequate power 
Financial aid 
Favorable tax structure 
Transportation facilities 
Number of Times 
Ranked First 
142 
96 
93 
89 
81 
69 
48 
38 
31 
25 
22 
20 
18 
18 
16 
11 
SOURCE: Bergin, Thomas and Eagan, William. "Economic Growth & Community Facilities." 
Municipal Finance, May, 1964. 
according to that purpose. 
Reasons for the inconsistency in findings of the 
various studies may have to do with the areas of the coun-
try studied, the periods in which the studies were conduct-
ed, and the details of the bond programs. But according 
to Margaret Dewar, the difference in results are most 
likely due to differences in methodology. 23 Surveys of 
firms by mail questionnaire, the most common technique, 
tend to contain questions that suggest answers, thus 
biasing conclusions. She conducted her research through 
personal interviews with open-ended questions that should 
correct many of these problems. 
One potential problem with her study is the small 
sample used: fourteen firms in eastern Massachusetts. 
The interviews explored the decision that a move or ex-
pansion was necessary, the choice of a region for location, 
the selection of a location within a region, and the 
decision to use revenue bond financing. 
Results showed that IRBs had nothing to do with the 
decision to move or expand. The question about places 
considered for new plant locations showed that firms were 
not deciding to make interregional moves. When managers 
talked about the intraregional choice of a new site they 
mentioned many of the criteria generally believed to be 
significant in location decisions, such as transportation 
and labor availability. A liberal interpretation of the 
effects of the bond program is that five out of fourteen 
(JO) 
firms' decisions were affected. The bonds did not cause 
firms to locate in areas of high unemployment. 
These examples are not meant to be a representative 
sample of the many studies that have been done in this area. 
It points out that caution must be taken in using IRBs if 
it is found that other location characteristics dominate 
firms' decisions. Their true positive impact must be 
assessed and the use of IRBs must be channeled or targeted 
to maximize that impact. 
Suggestions for Improvement 
Many suggestions have been made over the years con-
cerning the best way to deal with industrial revenue bonds. 
These have ranged from precautionary measures, to changes 
in the scope of the program, to complete elimination. 
In 1965 the Municipal Forum of New York issued a 
report on industrial aid financing in which it discusses 
the pros and cons, and recommends that this device be used 
with care. It does not take a position on the issue, but 
suggests that: 
(1) State a g encies should control the issuance of 
bonds; 
(2) The subsidized industry should help pay for the 
expanded municipal services that become necessary; 
(J) All local issues should be supported by revenues. 
The government should not be overprotective of 
the investor. 
(4) Full disclosure of all pertinent facts is in the 
public good and should be adhered to. 
(5) Piracy should b e prohibited. Municipal industrial 
aid should be made available only for a bona fide 
(J1) 
plant expansion, not relocation. 24 
The committee which issued the report finds that indus-
trial aid financing is consistent with the "American way"; 
its suppression would be an encroachment upon the philosophy 
of free enterprise. Opponents who seek legislation are 
inviting federal invasion of the sovereignty of the states. 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
studied the question of industrial development bond finan-
cing in a report issued in June of 1963. They did not take 
a stand on its continuation or elimination, but sought to 
make industrial aid a more acceptable tool for economic 
growth . They favored limiting their use to rural and semi-
rural areas. The report highlights ways the program has 
been abused and sets forth a suggested program for states 
to follow. The program provides: 
(1) All issues would be subject to the approval of a 
state supervisory agency; 
(2) Their issuance would be limited solely to counties 
and municipalities; 
(J) The states would give priority to issue to those 
communities with surplus labor; 
(4) A limitation should be imposed on the total 
amount of such bonds which may be outstanding at 
any one time in any given state; 
(5) The states would insure the enactment of legisla-
tion ruling out the possibility of "piracy" of 
industrial plants by one company from another; 
(6) Amend the Internal Revenue Code so that "firms 
which buy the bonds cannot deduct as a business 
cost the rents payed for the use of the subsidized 
plants". This is to check any abuse of the tax 
exempt provision.25 
(J2) 
The Commission concludes that industrial aid should be 
confined to "economically justifiable proportions and cir-
cumstances" if it is to be effective. 
The Investment Bankers Association took its position 
opposing industrial aid financing in 1951. Despite this 
resolution, the interest of businesses have caused more 
and more investment bankers to enter the field of under-
writing industrial aid bonds. As a result the Municipal 
Securities Committee of the IBA recommended in May of 1963 
that legislation be passed as the only way left to curb 
the use of industrial financing. 
Organized labor is unequivocally opposed to municipal 
industrial aid financing. It claims that it fosters plant 
pirating from developed to underdeveloped areas. "Already 
thousands of AFL-CIO members have lost their jobs because 
of plant piracy while the communities from which their jobs 
have disappeared become new candidates for the depressed 
area list. We call upon Congress and the Administration 
to end the improper use of the revenue raised from the tax-
free state and local bonds ... 1126 
Those opposed to industrial aid financing fear its 
abuses. But many feel that abuses can be controlled. They 
call upon opponents to take a broader view of "public 
purpose" and realize that industrial aid financing can 
perform a needed public service. 
While a few groups either vehemently oppose or 
strongly favor industrial revenue bond financing, many feel 
(JJ) 
that the program's goals and approach must be reassessed. 
Even though it has been updated over the years, its scope 
must be refocused to adapt to current economic realities. 
It is felt that the program has become so widespread as to 
render itself useless. This is apparent in the popular 
phrase, "The second war between the states", which used to 
describe IRB usage. 
In order to focus the program and to counter the 
criticism that the bonds provide unjustified business sub-
sidies, several states have enacted further restrictions. 
Since 1978 the New Jersey Economic Development Authority's 
IRB activities have become more closely focused on areas 
of high unemployment, low per capita income, and low per 
capita ratables. It has restricted its assistance for 
commercial and retail facilities to Urban Aid cities, 
cities eligible for Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs), 
or cities which qualify on the basis of its own unemployrnent-
income ratables index. 27 The Authority refuses to support 
relocation out of large urban cities, and it will no 
longer provide funds for the construction of facilities 
built on speculation anywhere outside its targeted cities. 
Although the program tries to target the bonds to distressed 
areas, its provisions to pinpoint eligible areas is rather 
loose. 
An "area" incorporates a whole city, and could poten-
tially envelope a region. It doesn't pinpoint certain 
decaying sections of cities, such as older central business 
( 34) 
districts (CBDs). It basically insures that affluent com-
munities don't abuse the program. 
One of the more stringent local guidelines is found 
in Erie County, New York. In February, 1980 the Erie 
County Industrial Development Agency (ECIDA) adopted a 
five part policy statement on commercial project revenue 
bonds: 
(1) Public financing should be used only to induce a 
·firm's location or expansion based on a demonstra-
table need for such project, its assets to the 
region and growth potential, and evidence that 
the project is integrated with targeted redevelop-
ment areas. 
(2) Bonds should be used only for projects that would 
be economically infeasible without the assistance. 
(J) Only projects that provide needed services in the 
area will be funded, provided that it does not 
cause substantial disruption of existing employ-
ment or facilities of a similar nature in the 
area. 
(4) The project must provide substantial employment 
and capital investment. 
(5) The agency will require that a payment in lieu 
of taxes equivalent to 100% of the assessed 
valuation tax levy be contracted to both the 
county and municipality.28 
The restrictions apply to commercial projects and not 
industrial projects because of the disparity between the 
two in terms of economic benefits, such as the number and 
quality of jobs created. 
In Erie County, areas are targeted according to census 
tract unemployment statistics, and the amount of effort and 
funding provided by the city for the area. The entire city 
of Buffalo is included as a distressed area. It does not 
(35) 
• 
focus the program to specific commercial districts. In 
addition to geographic targeting, there are eligibility 
criteria set up for businesses also. The firm must employ 
a minimum of 100 persons, and contain a minimum of $2.5 
million funding from all sources. Due to these guidelines, 
they've turned down at least 200 projects, including some 
companies that have been cited in the past as "chronic 
abusers" of the program. 
ECIDA has qualified five projects in Buffalo, and has 
closed on two. The Gateway-Waterfront project, which 
revitalized siyty-siy acres of vacant urban renewal land, 
could not have moved forward without some incentives to 
developers. The initial developer put $10 million into 
the project, which set a precedent for the area and 
coalesced the investments. It accelerated committments 
from banks, and induced a spinoff effect. Eventually, 
$90 million worth of additional investments plus a UDAG 
were attracted to the once vacant area. 29 
The IRB process promotes close cooperation between 
the public and private sectors, and is attractive to invest-
ment bankers because the projects are reviewed for eligibi-
lity beforehand by ECIDA. By actively marketing IRBs with 
specific targeting criteria, ECIDA has been able to avoid 
many of the abuses of the IRB program in g eneral. 
In response to a survey of National Association of 
Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) members in 
April of 1981, there was overwhelming approval of the 
(J6) 
strategy to target IRBs according to some distress cri-
teria. Some of the comments follow: 
- IRBs created 8,000 jobs and retained 7,000 jobs 
in Philadelphia; more than 215 firms, both commercial 
and industrial, were assisted, stimulating unlimited 
spin-off development and investment in parts of the 
city which have suffered decades of high unemployment 
and low investment ... These firms and their employers 
pay taxes -- federal, state and local -- which more 
than compensate for any initial loss to the Treasury. 
- The Fort Wayne Planning Agency's view of the 
enabling state legislation is that it is lacking in 
criteria by which to evaluate a proposed project. 
"Our planning function would be better served if a 
standard comprehensive evaluation process were 
required by law for each IRB issue". 
- The Portsmouth Industrial Development Authority 
has and will continue to restrict use of tax-ex empt 
financing to designated redevelopment or conservation 
areas. Targeting will enable truly distressed cities 
to compete more favorably with outlying areas which 
have vast amounts of vacant land for new development. 
IRBs are a vital tool in attracting potential 
developers to areas which in many cases are marginal 
at best.JO 
Local officials see IRBs as primin~ an economic pump, 
not welfare for business.Ji 
Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 
1981 and the ensuing budget cuts, Congressional scrutiny 
and public debate over the future of IRBs has been wide-
spread. But this is not to say that their functioning has 
been ignored in the past. In 1978 the Carter administration 
proposed elimination of the tax exemption for most small 
issues while expanding it for projects built in designated 
distressed areas. Congress accepted only the second half 
of the proposal by raising the capital spending limit from 
$10 million to $20 million for projects located in areas 
(J7) 
• 
receiving a UDAG. As of the end of 1980, the Treasury 
hadn't issued regulations detailing eligibility criteria. 
Congressional testimony provided in April of 1981 to 
the House Ways and Means oversight subcommittee both 
praised and scorned the use of tax-exempt bonds. Represen-
tative Charles Rangel (D - NY), chairman of the subcommit-
tee, submitted a bill that contains specific recommendations 
for changes in IRB legislation, linking their use for com-
mercial projects to economically distressed areas. It also 
requires that a comprehensive study be conducted by the 
Treasury, with analysis of data and recommendations 
presented to the committee by July 1, 1983. This bill is 
still pending in committee. 
A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report released in 
the beginning of 1980 outlined the use and abuse of small 
issue IRBs, and their effects as they impact on federal, 
state and local tax revenues. The CBO report noted that 
sales of small issue IRBs have grown rapidly from $1.J 
billion in 1975 to $8.4 billion in 1980; and that revenue 
losses to the federal government in FY '81 are estimated to 
be slightly greater than $1 billion. CBO's revenue loss 
estimates are based on several economic assumptions that 
have been contested by other economists. The revenue gains 
from eliminating IRBs would be less than the budgetary cost 
because feedback effects (lower tax collections from 
reduced economic activity) would offset part of the revenue 
gain.3 2 Many feel that as a job generating and revenue 
(JS) 
raising tool for the local governments, the value of IRBs 
is underestimated. 
The eventual fate of the tax exemptions is still un-
known. Policy options offered from Congress, the Adminis-
tration, CBO and the President's Commission on Housing 
range from maintaining current law to complete elimination 
of IRBs. In between are such options as: 
(a) targeting the bonds' use to distressed areas; 
(b) limiting the commercial use of the bonds; 
(c) elimination of the exemption with a compensating 
federal payment to subsidize taxable bond yields; 
(d) requiring public accountability of the use, 
either by the pledging of the full faith and 
credit of the locality or requiring public 
hearings and referendums; 
(e) a local cash match; and 
(f) choosing between the tax exemption or use of the 
accelerated depreciation provisions of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act.33 
The President 0 s Commission on Housing will establish 
a task force to review use of tax-exempt revenue bonds.34 
The CBO report poses a question for Congress to con-
sider: "Under what circumstances do federal subsidies that 
lower the borrowing costs of private industry serve a 
public purpose?" CBO suggests two goals that could be 
served: (1) stimulating investment and employment; and 
(2) modifying the market's allocation of credit.35 They 
state that if the goal of federal investment subsidies is to 
increase investment and employment, a general business tax 
cut such as those contained in the Economic Recovery Tax 
( 39) 
Act might be equally effective. If the purpose of the 
bonds is to stimulate development in economically distressed 
areas, then Congress may want to consider ways to target 
IRBs toward specific locations or regions and to coordinate 
use of the bonds not only with UDAGs, but also with other 
federal credit programs. 
Despite the much publicized and reported abuses that 
have been connected with IRBs, their merits deserve as much 
attention so that they can be analyzed and reworked to 
solve current problems. An alternative to eliminating them 
in order to curb abuses is to fine tune IRBs to offer a 
means of attracting productive investments. Without re-
strictions to curb abuses or targeting requirements to 
make the financing attractive in under-invested areas, 
critics of the program have a strong case. But with 
widespread support from both Democrats and Republicans, 
their complete elimination is unlikely. The program's 
goals must be rethought and focused, and the value and 
potential of IRBs must be realized and altered to conform 
to these new goals. 
(40) 
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CHAPTER III: 
ORIGINS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
COMMERCIAL AREA REVITALIZATION DISTRICT PROGRAM 
Introduction 
In order to fully understand and appreciate the goals 
of the Massachusetts Commercial Area Revitalization District 
(CARD) Program, an in-depth chronology of significant 
events is necessary. The program did not suddenly material-
ize one day as a stop-gap measure to relieve some iminent 
crisis. Rather, the program and its goals evolved over 
many years of deliberation and debate between a variety of 
actors. The emergence of the issues on which the program 
is based cannot be precisely determined. Its tangible 
background begins in 1973 with the establishment of the 
Wetmore/McKinnon Commission. Five solid years of consider-
ation ensued which produced a long-term Growth Policy for 
Massachusetts. This included action recommendations from 
which implementation tools were devised. The Massachusetts 
CARD program was one such tool, using the amended industrial 
revenue bond legislation as part of its incentive package. 
The specific details of the CARD program are not presented 
in this section, but the goals and intentions stated herein 
are directly transferable and applicable to the program. 
Likewise, the key actors and sequence of events that follow 
are not specific to the CARD program itself, but they are 
the indirect forces behing the program's emergence. 
Background 
Most states in the U.S. have some form of legislation 
dealing with land use issues. They rang e from comprehensive 
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programs which require state permits for local land use 
developments, to state coordination of local land use 
decision-making, to specific land use programs; i.e., 
surface mining, flood plain regulations, wetland management, 
etc. State land use legislation has tended to be a response 
to a problem of crisis proportions, such as Vermont's boom 
in recreation communities, and the severe drought experi-
enced in Florida. 
In the early 1970's, Massachusetts lacked any obvious 
land use catastrophy that needed an immediate response. 
Instead, it was experiencing a steady overall economic 
decline in relation to the rest of the United States. 
Between 1951 and 1971 urban land increased by 85%, while 
population only increased 21%. The supply of farmland has 
declined by JO% from 1945 to 1976. Between 1970 and 1975 
the unemployment rate in Massachusetts increased from 4.6% 
to 12.4% while the national average increased from 4.9% 
to 8.5%. Much of this is the result of the switch of the 
state's economy from the industrial to service sector. 
While national production in manufacturing, mining, and 
construction grew 17% between 1960 and 1973 it declined in 
Massachusetts by 11%. Service industries grew 58% nation-
ally and 89% in Massachusetts. Much of the increased 
growth in the service sector in the state is located in 
the eastern suburban communities. 1 Although these trends 
may have had land use implications, they did not warrant 
special legislation. 
(48) 
The state has a long history of strong, autonomous 
local self-government. County government and regional 
planning have been largely ineffective in Massachusetts, 
since the entire land area is included within the 351 incor-
porated cities and townships. This tradition was strengthen-
ed in 1966 in the Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment, which 
implied that the control of growth and land use was 
primarily a local concern. Consequently, past attempts by 
the state government to influence land use or growth 
patterns have always been viewed with great skepticism and 
resentment. 
This tradition of home rule must be contrasted with 
the state legislature's long history of progressive social 
reforms. Numerous state agencies carry out programs that 
indirectly shape land use and growth patterns, (transpor-
• 
tation investments, air and water quality management, tax 
policy, etc.) although coordination among them is lacking. 
There is apparent contradiction between local response to 
state interference in land use decision-making and the en-
actment of various statutes which give the state overriding 
power. One explanation is that since all these bills 
provide for substantial local involvement in their adminis-
tration, they manage to win support in the legislature. 
Massachusetts Growth Policy And Development Act 
Prior· to 1975, Massachusetts did not have an articu-
lated urban policy. In 1973 the Great and General Court 
(the legislature) enacted a bill establishing a ''Special 
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Commission Relative to the Effects of Present Growth Pat-
terns on the Quality of Life in Massachusetts." (Chapter 
98 of the Resolves of 1973.) The Commission was the result 
of a resolution filed by Representative Robert Wetmore, in 
response to the conflict in the late 1960's between economic 
development and environmental protection. State Senators 
Saltonstall and McKinnon and Representatives Ames and 
Wetmore, the prime movers behind this effort, were also 
concerned because of the lack of a coordinated planning 
effort in the executive branch. The Commission was given 
a Broad mandate to study a variety of issues, including: 
demographic and population trends, the preservation of 
agricultural land and open space, the supply and utilization 
of the state's land and natural resources, and methods of 
community, regional and state planning. 2 The legislature 
adjourned in November of 1973. For almost a year, the 
Commission remained inactive. 
At the time of the election of Governor Michael Dukakis 
in November, 1974 the Growth Commission had just begun to 
identify its goals. The General Court received a great 
many bills dealing with a variety of issues, including 
land use, growth policy, environmental protection, economic 
development, and the reorganization of planning responsibi-
lities. In order for this Special Commission (called the 
Wetmore/ McKinnon Commission) to deal with the scope of 
these problems it divided its work by creating four investi-
gative subcommittees. The Commission was unfunded and 
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relied on voluntary staff support to analyze proposed legis-
lation and prepare reports and recommendations. 
The subcommittees varied in their ability to attract 
outside staff support to generate citizen interest. The 
Public Education and Demographi~ Information Subcommittees 
dissolved, and the Growth Policy Subcommittee never 
produced a final report. Only the Land Use Subcommittee 
was a success, due in large part to the diversity of its 
staff. Its chairman, Senator William Saltonstall, was able 
to attract over fifty representatives of business, industry, 
labor, environmental organizations, state, regional •. and 
local officials and the academic community to discuss land 
use in Massachusetts. Staff committments were obtained 
from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), led by 
Professor Lawrence Susskind, as well as the State Department 
of Community Affairs. 
Initial meetings were attended by over one-hundred 
people, which eventually divided into six major interest 
groups. After six months of bi-weekly meetings, perceptions 
began to change and compromise was reached. Two distinct 
coalitions formed: the "process-oriented" and the "strong 
bill" factions. The members of the first group were pre-
dominantly state legislators, local officials, representa-
tives of homebuilding and manufacturing interests, and 
moderate environmentalists. Included in this group was 
Professor Lawrence Susskind of MIT. They agreed on the 
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following principles: 
(1) Land use decision-making should remain a local 
prerogative. 
(2) Local planning is not sufficiently linked to 
decision-making, and the planning process is not 
open to public scrutiny. 
(J) The state affects land use patterns through 
activities which have no central policy guidance. 
(4) Land use policy must achieve economic development 
objectives, not just preserving environmental 
resources. 
( 5) Land use planning is not just a rural or suburban 
concern.3 
To address these problems, the coalition recommended 
that localities submit annual planning statements to be 
used as the basis for state land use policies. This 
approach emphasized the process of local participation as 
well as the policies that might emerge. 
The "strong bill" coalition, which included representa-
tives of certain state agencies, strong environmentalists, 
and representatives from regional planning agencies, did 
not agree with this "bottom-up" approach. State agencies 
were competing for designation as the state's lead land 
use agency. They felt that growth management problems 
were well understood, and that local growth policy state-
ments and citizen involvement would take away from things 
that would really have an impact, such as administrative 
action by a lead land use agency. The environmentalists 
felt that the coalition would not address the state's 
critical environmental needs. The "process-oriented" 
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approach was viewed as a diluted compromise among divergent 
groups, and therefore would have no impact . The regional 
planning agencies had continuously been pressing for reform 
of middle-level (county) government in Massachusetts. They 
maintained that a state-wide participatory process would 
fail, based on the lack of interest in existing participa-
tory opportunities at the regional level. 4 
Thus, by late February 1975, each faction began to 
draft its own legislative proposals, since there were two 
distinct concepts of the type of land use bill that 
Massachusetts should adopt. 
At this time Governor Dukakis created a new Office of 
State Planning (OSP), which was given responsibility for 
land use, growth policy, and comprehensive planning for 
the state. This meant that existing state agencies would 
no longer be in competition for designation as the state's 
leading land use agency. In addition, the Governor in-
formed the Wetmore/McKinnon Commission that he did not see 
the need for new land use or growth policy legislation. 
Dukakis intended to take an administrative approach to the 
resolution of these issues. This meant that the possibility 
of passing a strong regionally-oriented land use bill or 
new environmental legislation was extremely low. As a 
result of the Governor's stated position, the cohesiveness 
of the "strong bill" coalition rapidly dissipated. 
The March 27, 1975 Land Use Subcommittee meeting 
began routinely, but discussion quickly jumped to the 
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problems of a process-oriented legislative approach. Debate 
and eventual compromise over some of the issues resulted in 
the first draft of legislation by the process-oriented 
coalition. The "strong bill" coalition also prepared its 
own outline of compromise legislation, which contained only 
minimal concessions. A meeting of the special drafting 
committee was held on April 16 to prepare final legislation 
to be presented to the entire Subcommittee on April 24. 
The "process-oriented" coalition offered its final argument: 
... Economic decline is clearly the most highly 
perceived issue in the state ... We must attempt to 
design legislation that will work towards balancing 
the needs for economic development and the needs for 
environmental protection. That is, we must encourage 
economic growth in areas in which it is appropriate 
and where people want it ... Only a process that 
involves a large number of people from all levels 
of government will be able to formulate such policies 
and carry out their implementation ... Local groups, 
for the first time, will be given a formal mechanism 
for assessing their changing needs and priorities 
and informing state and local government of alterna-
tive policy solutions which may better address their 
needs.5 
The Subcommittee leadership and other legislators 
present decided that the draft of the "process-oriented" 
bill should be submitted to the entire Subcommittee for its 
consideration. 
Prior to the full Subcommittee's review, Governor 
Dukakis appointed Mr. Frank Keefe as director of the Office 
of State Planning. This marked the permanent dissipation 
of the "strong bill" coalition, since several of its 
members had been actively pursuing control of the newly 
created OSP. More importantly, Keefe committed himself to 
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working with the Subcommittee, and to review their draft 
legislation. 
An explanation of Keefe's background and position of 
power indicates his strong influence on the final legisla-
tion. The Governor designated Keefe as an ex-officio 
member of his cabinet, reporting directly to him. Keefe 
quickly became a major player in the Dukakis administration, 
through his intimate advisory role to the Governor. When 
~ 
the cabinet, bureaucracy, local officials, and private 
sector leaders became aware of this, Keefe's influence grew 
tremendously, which he used to the maximum advantage. 
His objectives as director of OSP was influenced by 
his previous position as director of planning in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, where he organized a revitalization strategy 
for the old textile city. He believed that the combination 
' of physical rehabilitation and strong government leadership 
and action would revitalize the decaying commercial downtown 
area. He proceeded to build much of this approach into 
Statewide policy. 
The principal vehicle in the administration through 
which Keefe and OSP exercised a significant role was the 
Development Cabinet. This group was formed during 
informal meetings between Keefe and those cabinet members 
directly involved in growth and urban-related issues: the 
Secretaries of Transportation, Economic Affairs, Environ-
mental Affairs, Communities and Development, and Consumer 
Affairs. Dukakis formally designated this group the 
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''Development Cabinet" in the Fall of 1975, Its role was to 
deal with a wide range of issues, but their evaluation 
tended to be in terms of the revitalization of city and 
town centers. The development cabinet attempted to get 
relevant agencies and programs to be consistent with the 
city centers policy. The principal emphasis was the 
implementation of an economic development policy, channeled 
to older town and city centers. 
The promotion of this orientation cannot be attributed 
to Frank Keefe alone. Governor Dukakis came to office with 
economic development as his central theme, along with 
urban revitalization and halting urban sprawl. These two 
objectives, distinguished as a growth/development policy 
and an urban policy respectively, were interrelated. Eco-
nomic growth was to be targeted and channeled toward urban 
revitalization. The uniqueness of Dukakis' policies is 
this linkage between economic growth and the use of the 
state's powers and leadership to direct it to particular 
locations. This was clearly evidenced in the state's 
public investment strategy, and in its committment to 
locate state activities in city or town centers. 
In addition, Dukakis directed OSP to develop a state 
master plan to guide the allocation of state funds and to 
identify appropriate areas for development and preserva-
t . 6 ion. 
It is interesting to note that the role played by 
Professor Lawrence Susskind was considered crucial in the 
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evolution of the legislation.? He and his group from MIT 
not only worked with the leadership of the Growth Commission 
but also played a key role in pursuading Frank Keefe and 
the Governor to support the process. His influence on the 
content of Dukakis policies, though, seems to have been 
marginal. 
This outline of the key actors and their orientations 
provides a crucial background on which to view the unfolding 
of the final legislation. 
On April 24, 1975 Keefe e xpressed concern to the Land 
Use Subcommittee about coordinating state policies which 
affect growth, streamlining regulatory procedures which 
impede economic development, and focusing on strategies 
for revitalization of urban centers. 8 He reiterated the 
Governor's position against new legislation, using an 
administrative solution instead. The Subcommittee analyzed 
this "bottom-up" policy, and recommended several minor 
changes in the draft legislation. 
Nex t, the leaders of the Wetmore/McKinnon Commission 
reviewed the revised draft, and were e x tremely interested 
in the legislation. They asked Frank Keefe to review it, 
since its goals were aligned with the duties of OSP. 
The staff of the Subcommittee continued to revise the 
draft legislation in response to comments received. Also, 
they met with Keefe and his staff regularly in an attempt 
to convince OSP of the validity of the "bottom-up" approach. 
Keefe maintained the Governor' s position, that integration 
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and coordination of state and local policies and planning 
could be handled administratively. This view in the 
Dukakis administration reflected several factors: first, 
a new governor's natural impatience at having to wait on 
a policy which would take months or possibly years; second, 
a preoccupation on the part of Dukakis and Keefe with 
urban issues and less concern with general land use and 
environmental issues; third, a conviction that, because 
Massachusetts already had very strong land use and environ-
mental laws on the books which was passed in the late 
sixties and early seventies, administrative action and 
not new legislation, was needed.9 The Land Use Subcommittee 
staff took the position that a joint legislative-administra-
tive approach to the formulation of land use and growth 
management policies would be more effective than separate 
efforts by either group. They suggested a new argument 
relating to the organizational objectives of the OSP. If 
OSP was to succeed in its policy coordination efforts, 
it would need a constituency to support its decisions. 
Since many state policies seemed to have negative or con-
tradictory impacts on localities, the most appropriate 
constituency would be localities. Through the "bottom-up" 
growth policy formulation process, localities could express 
their needs and concerns and provide support for OSP recom-
mendations to change existing policy. 
In response to these arguments Keefe began to change 
his position. He came to . see a potential payoff in 
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developing a constituency for the Governor's program in the 
towns and cities, so he persuaded the Governor to support 
the bill. He convinced Dukakis that a state master plan 
would be difficult to produce and was less important than 
a comprehensive planning process. Also, legislation 
would increase public understanding of growth and develop-
ment issues more successfully than administrative efforts 
alone. 
On July 21, 1975 the Wetmore/McKinnon Commission 
approved the final draft of the legislation, which contained 
revisions by OSP and the Land Use Subcommittee. The bill 
was entitled, "An Act Providing for the Formulation of a 
Massachusetts Growth and Development Policy." It was sent 
to the Joint Committee on Commerce and Labor to emphasize 
the intent to balance economic development and environmental 
protection. 
The Commission members and Land Use Subcommittee staff 
met with a variety of citizens and interest groups prior 
to the public hearing, and attracted considerable support 
for the bill. On the Senate floor the bill received 
routine consideration. There was little debate since 
Senators Saltonstall and McKinnon had cleared the way with 
the Senate leadership. 
Review by the House of Representatives did not go so 
smoothly. Representatives Wetmore and Demers met with 
every member of the leadership to secure support. At 
this time a small group of home rule proponents began to 
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actively lobby against the bill. There was considerable 
debate during the three readings, with a number of minor 
amendments included. Wetmore ended the debate by saying: 
This legislation is not an attempt to reduce local 
autonomy. It is an effort to enhance planning capabil-
ities of all levels of government. In the past, much 
of the land use and growth policy legislation that 
the General Court has reviewed was based on the pre-
determined notion that the state government knows 
precisely what Massachusetts' land use and growth 
management problems entail. In fact, one of the 
primary assumptions in previous legislative approaches 
was that local governments are incapable of dealing 
with certain types of problems. In contrast, our 
Commission decided to ask the people of Massachusetts 
what they think the most important growth and develop-
ment issues are. We've asked the citizens to help 
governmental officials to balance our needs for both 
economic development and environmental protection. 
We want future growth and development policies to 
reflect the needs and concerns of citizens and 
communities throughout the Commonwealth. This 
effort to involve local officials and citizens in 
the preparation and evaluation of state-wide growth 
and development policies is unparalleled by any 
state in the nation. Cooperation between the ex ec-
utive and legislative branches in the development of 
this bill has been outstanding. If the bill passes, 
this cooperation is insured of continuing. State 
growth and development policies are as much a respon-
sibility of this General Court as of the executive 
branch. We now have the opportunity to develop 
coordinated growth policies for the state which will 
reflect local and regional concerns and have the 
backing which they need to be effective. For these 
reasons, I strongly urge passage of the bill. It 
does not infringe on local home rule. Quite the 
contrary, it seeks to insure that the cities and 
towns will have substantial impact on their own and 
the state's future growth patterns.10 
With this statement, debate ended and the bill was 
passed. On December 22, 1975, Governor Dukakis signed the 
Massachusetts Growth Policy Development Act into law. 
O.S.P. Report: "City And Town Centers" 
The first phase of th e effort by the Wetmore/McKinnon 
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Commission to initiate a state comprehensive planning 
process was over. The legislation itself was not viewed 
as a solution to the many land use and growth management 
problems confronting Massachusetts. It was an initial step 
leading to a new outlook toward planning and implementation 
of a policy formulation process involving all levels of 
government in the Commonwealth. The Growth Policy and 
Development Act represents an agreement between state and 
local government to engage in a learning process that does 
not embody a clear cut conception of what the end results 
will be. It is a creative rather than a reactive approach 
to both citizen participation and public learning. 11 
The Growth Policy Act mandated a "bottom-up'' process 
consisting of the following steps: 
(1) Local Growth Policy Committees, broadly represen-
tative of municipal boards, departments, and 
interests in each community, would specify local 
growth management problems and objectives; 
(2) Regional planning agencies (RPA's) would compile 
local growth policy statements and prepare com-
posite regional reports highlighting development 
and conservation needs in each part of the state; 
(J) The Office of State Planning would study all the 
local statements and regional reports and prepare 
an overall summary of state growth policy objec-
tives responsive to local and regional prefer-
ences; and 
(4) The Legislative Commission on the Effects of 
Growth Patterns on the Quality of Life in Massa-
chusetts (which drafted the Growth Policy Act) 
would r evi ew the OSP report, hold hearings, and 
recommend legislative and administrative steps 
n ecessary to implement growt h policies responsive 
to local and reg ional priorities.12 
Whil e t h e bill es tablishing t h is proces s did not 
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require any locality to participate, a very large fraction 
chose to do so. The communities realized that the state 
was serious about developing a growth policy, so most 
responded to protect their own interests. No penalties 
would be imposed if the locality did not set up a committee, 
but they would incur an indirect "penalty" by foregoing 
their input into the state planning process. 
Three-hundred-and-thirty (330) of the three-hundred-
and-fifty-one (351) cities and towns in Massachusetts 
participated in the growth policy development process. 
More than six-thousand (6,000) residents served as members 
of Local Growth Policy Committees; thousands more were 
involved in various local and regional hearings. For sixty 
percent (60%) of the cities and towns that prepared state-
ments, the process was extremely valuable at the local 
level. 13 This is observable now that local growth manage-
ment policies are more explicit, many more residents 
understand the implications of current growth management 
policies, boards and departments are pulling in the same 
direction rather than working at cross-purposes, action 
agenda have been fashioned, and individuals who never par-
ticipated in local affairs have been drawn directly into 
the work of municipal governrnent. 14 
In October, 1977, the Office of State Planning pub-
lished its summary report entitled, City and Town Centers; 
A Program for Growth. It is divided into five sections: 
(1) An overview of local perspectives on growth 
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management; 
(2) A region-by-region review of areawide growth 
management concerns and priorities; 
(J) A summary of state perspectives on growth; 
(4) An analysis of the points of agreement and dis-
agreement revealed in the first three chapters; 
and 
(5) A final chapter outlining specific policy and 
action recommendations. 
The summary of local perspectives on growth indicates 
that cities and towns are especially concerned about pre-
serving their physical character, their social and cultural 
character, and the political or governmental organization 
to which they have grown accustomed. According to Local 
Growth Policy Committees, threats to community character 
include: rapid and ill-accommodated growth, environmental 
degredation, the loss of agricultural activities, suburban-
ization of outlying areas and the urbanization of inner 
suburbs, loss of open space and historic assets, deteriora-
tion of traditional centers, poorly planned commercial 
developments, and state and federal intrusion into local 
affairs. 15 
The chapter summarizing the state's view of growth 
management priorities is not an attempt to respond to the 
issues raised in the local and regional sections. Instead, 
it presents the key ideas which are presently being used 
to guide state investment and regional strategies. These 
were e xpressed in two earlier OSP position papers, entitled 
Towards a Growth Policy for Massachusetts and An Economic 
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Development Program for Massachusetts, released in October 
of 1975 and April of 1976, respectively. The state's 
emphasis is on the location and quality of growth (revital-
ization of center cities), the level of growth (with 
respect to economic development, energy, capital formation 
and transportation) , and the role of government in stimu-
lating and channeling growth. 
The fourth chapter highlights the points on which the 
three levels of government agree: increasing economic 
development; revitalizing city and town centers; maintaining 
environmental quality; property tax relief; preserving farm 
land; and sensitizing the state to differences in community 
16 preferences. The points of disagreement are posed as 
"choices": growth/no growth; public policy/market forces; 
regionalism/home rule; and revenue needs/tax reform. 
' The final chapter presents an eight part statement of 
growth policy objectives, which lead directly to specific 
action recommendations. Some of these recommendations are 
restatements of proposals that the Governor and his staff 
have been advocating for some time, while others unquestion-
ably grew out of OSP 's effort to respond to .the comments of 
localities and regions. Excerpts taken from the introduc-
tion of the report help to illustrate these points: 
The title, City and Town Centers: A Program for 
Growth is intended to convey a primary, though not 
the only, theme in this report. Certainly, all 
future growth could not and should not be channeled 
into existing cities and centers. But after a careful 
reading and analysis of all growth policy statements, 
it is clear that if Massachusetts is to retain and 
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revive community and regional character and if the 
negative fiscal, environmental and social impacts of 
sprawl are to be avoided, major emphasis must be 
placed at all levels of government on the encourage-
ment of new growth and development in our city and 
town centers. 
On the surface, a dilemma emerges from the growth 
policy process. On the one hand, communities know 
that the state will and must continue to grow if 
sufficient employment and housing are to be available 
for the expanding population. And yet, on the other 
hand, many communities want to remain the same ... 
Villages don't want to be suburbs; suburbs don't 
want to be cities; and cities don't want to be 
wastelands. And in this general desire we have the 
resolution to the apparent dilemma. By revitalizing 
the major regional centers and by facilitating the 
expansion of jobs and housing in central cities we 
can sustain the character of these communities as 
employment and population centers. And by encouraging 
most of the increase in people and jobs in suburban 
and rural towns to locate in or adjacent to their 
centers, the identity of these communities will remain 
separate and distinct from their neighbors and the 
role of their centers in the life of the community 
will be enhanced. 
Thus, the goal of revitalizing city and town 
centers is seen as a direct response to an over-
whelming desire to preserve the character of the 
Commonwealth's communities and regions. Perhaps more 
importantly it is an appropriate response to the 
often e xpressed concerns about the loss of farmland, 
and the deterioration of the environment, exorbitant 
local and state tay es, the needless waste of limited 
energy resources, the anticipated demands for decent 
housing by an unprecedented number of new households, 
and the nagging problem of chronic unemployment.17 
Apparently, the structure of the report and many of its 
recommendations are closely linked with OSP and gubernato-
rial positions. This suggests an unfortunate degree of 
"selective perception" (i.e., previously-held positions 
have dominated the process of categorizing and interpreting 
new information). The report is clearly a political 
document and therefore is not likely to include recommenda-
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t . . th G ' . · t l8 ions opposing e overnor s viewpoin . 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the 
major problems addressed in City and Town Centers had been 
identified since the 1960's by state and local officials, 
leading citizens, and the media. The growth/urban problems 
as perceived in the middle and late 1970's in Massachusetts 
were not new or startling. The significant contribution of 
the Dukakis years was the linking of problems in a single 
coherent form, leading to a clear perspective on policy 
directions. 
The major question that still remains to be answered 
is whether or not the primary objective of the Growth 
Policy Act - the shaping of a state growth policy responsive 
to local and regional concerns - could and would be achieved. 
In October of 1977 a critique of the report was published, 
entitled The Impact of Local Participation on the Formulation 
of State Growth Policy in Massachusetts. The authors' 
analysis found that, by and large, the OSP report is respon-
sible to the concerns expressed in local growth policy 
statements and regional reports. They present five ways of 
justifying this judgement: 
(1) The choice of issues and topics discussed in the 
first two chapters follows those expressed in 
local and regional reports. Their priorities 
do not appear to have been manipulated by the 
state, although OSP did design the questionnaire 
and guidelines on which they were to base their 
deliberations. 
(2) Statewide policies have not taken regional differ-
ences into account in the past. OSP demonstrates 
an impressive sensitivity to regional variations 
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in this report. 
(3) The action recommendations are aimed at making 
state agencies aware of the need for increased 
flexibility and responsiveness to each community's 
priorities when administering programs. 
(4) The recommendations attempt to expand the capacity 
of local and regional boards to handle their own 
problems; few additional state regulations have 
been proposed. 
(5) OSP has proposed very specific measures (through 
action recommendations) to further the growth 
policy objectives of the cities and towns in the 
Commonwealth.19 
To most observers the process seems to have been a 
success, since participation was active, local reports were 
produced, and the OSP summary report was able to reflect a 
surprising consensus. 
Did this consensus (that city and town revitalization 
was central to the Growth Policy of Massachusetts) occur 
because of manipulation by Keefe and OSP? Were the local 
committees and regional agencies co-opted? William Capron 
thinks not, although he recognizes that OSP was able to 
influence the outcome in at least three ways: 
(1) By preparing the Duka~is administration's first 
statement on urban policy, Toward a Growth Policy 
for Massachusetts, released in October of 1975; 
(2) By formulating and distributing the questionnaire 
and handbook to local growth policy committees; 
and 
(J) By preparing the final r~Bort of the results of 
the "bottom-up" process. 
The local and regional agencies were serious about 
this exercise, despite their strong feelings of home rule 
and their skepticism toward state-run projects. If there 
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was any indication that the state was trying to co-opt them, 
local leaders would not have participated to the ex tent 
they did. This is partly confirmed by comments received 
after the publication of the report in September of 1977. 
From November 1977 through January 1978, the state Growth 
Policy Commission held seven hearings in various parts of 
the state to solicit comments from local officials, 
citizens, and members of local growth policy committees. 
Over 400 persons participated in these hearings; written 
and oral statements were received from about 200 persons. 
The Growth Commission's third interim report summarizes 
the results of these hearings: 
The OSP report was consistently praised for accur-
ately identifying and reporting local sentiments on 
important growth and development issues.21 
Thus, the Growth Policy that was to shape Massachu-
setts' future was a combination of two separate and 
distinct elements. One was an attempt to develop a new 
process that would identify the state's most pressing 
issues and problems through a "bottom-up'' approach. The 
major actors behind this effort were Senator Saltonstall, 
Repres entative Wetmore, and Professor Susskind. The other 
was the promotion of the established goals of the adminis-
tration at that time. Dukakis and Keefe were the key pro-
ponents of this effort. Each of the el ements work ed in 
combination with the other, producing a final product that 
was satisfactory to most, if not all, of the many interes ted 
parti es. 
(68) 
Implementation 
In actuality, the legislation and subsequent report 
were only the preliminary steps in achieving the intended 
results. The Growth Policy Development Act and City and 
Town Centers provided the framework on which to base implemen-
tation strategies. Seventeen bills have been enacted by the 
legislature, in direct response to specific recommendations 
22 included in OSP's report. In addition, a number of 
administrative actions have been taken through executive 
orders, and the Growth Policy has guided state resource 
allocation decisions. 
Several of the bills specifically focus on the revital-
ization of city and town centers. Three bills provide 
tax-exempt financing, mortgage guarantees, and property 
tax credit to commercial investors in blighted downtown 
areas. A local aid program was developed that includes a 
revised aid formula to help older urban communities. Speci-
fie legislation in 1978 was enacted to stimulate economic 
development and urban revitalization in Massachus e tts. 
These were deve loped primarily through the organization 
of regional conferences beginning in 1976. Ex t ensive 
meetings between the localities and the state through 
regional centers were h e lpful in three important ways. 
First, state officials developed an appreciation for the 
realities of local problems. Second, the shortcomings of 
state pro grams in addressing local problems and strategies 
were identified and corrected. Third, and most importantly, 
( 69 ) 
a cohesive working relationship between state and local 
officials was formed that was the catalyst in developing 
and approving legislation. This coalition of urban economic 
interests advanced the development priorities of local 
officials as well as created a force independent of the 
state to support growth policy legislation. 
Mayors, community development officials, developers, 
representatives of organized labor, and businessmen were 
enlisted in the legislative process at critical times. 
These groups were a key element in the passage of five 
economic development strategies: 
(1) Legislation established the Massachusetts Capital 
Resource Company, to provide funding to new 
businesses in the state; 
(2) Legislation established the Technology Development 
Corporation, to provide technical assistance and 
start-up capital to small, innovative technology-
based businesses; 
(J) Legislation established the Massachusetts Indus-
trial Finance Agency, to add several important 
improvements to the industrial revenue bond 
process; 
(4) Legislation established the Community Economic 
Development Assistance Corporation, to provide 
technical assistance to neighborhood redevelopment 
organizations in their efforts to bring about 
commercial revitalization and job creation; 
(5) Amendment to the industrial revenue bond legisla-
tion of 1968, to include commercial and mixed use 
projects targeted to distressed communities.23 
The long-term success of these programs depends on the 
capacity of state and local governments to organize and ad-
minister them. The new administration in Massachusetts 
under Governor King has eliminated the OSP and has turned 
(70) 
' 
over implementation of the urban policy to the Department 
of Communities and Development. The new Secretary, Byron 
Matthews, played an active role in the development and 
implementation of the Dukakis urban policy, and much of the 
bureaucracy embraces the policy's central elements. Thus, 
the foundation and support exists by which to carry through 
the programs adopted by the legislature. 
(71) 
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CHAPTER IV: 
CARD PROGRAM - RULES AND REGULATIONS 
A description of the Commercial Area Revitalization 
District Program serves to illustrate one mechanism that 
was developed by the Massachusetts Legislature to achieve 
the goal of urban revitalization. The philosophy of the 
program parallels the goals of the Growth Policy for Mass-
achusetts, displayed in the report by the Office of State 
Planning, City and Town Centers: A Program for Growth. It 
implies that urban revitalization is the keystone for social 
change, by restoring economic vitality and physical sound-
ness to communities. Local revitalization programs, such 
as CARD, have as a major goal to attract commercial, insti-
tutional, and office investments to city and town centers, 
close to urban populations. This is expected to reverse 
the trend toward sprawl, wasteful land use, and erosion of 
community character. This is based on three strategic 
principles: 
(1) New is not always better. Revitalization links 
a community's past to its future, and enhances 
the attractiveness for private investment through 
the identification of its own unique "character." 
(2) The definition of revitalization programs has 
expanded to include the use of public investments 
to leverage private investment and additional 
public committments. 
(3) Effectiveness of revitalization strategies is 
limited by the bias of federal and state invest-
ment programs toward exurban growth, which has 
reinforced the market bias of the last three 
decades. The state can help restore some balance 
in growth and land use decisions by changing the 
flow of public facility investments to city 
centers.1. 
(??) 
The CARD program's goal is to assist communities with 
older downtowns to reverse the trend of commercial decay by 
stimulating public and private investment. The public pro-
vides needed capital improvements and the private sector 
uses the CARD program's financial incentives to reverse the 
cycle of commercial disinvestment. These economic develop-
ment incentives, previously available only to industrial 
enterprises, can now be applied to commercial and mixed-use 
projects in targeted areas. Commercial projects may include 
the construction of a new building or the rehabilitation of 
an existing building for commercial purposes (i.e., hotels, 
office space, restaurants, etc.). Mixed-use projects 
include the rehabilitation of any single building for mixed 
commercial and residential use. 
The first incentive provides financing at interest 
rates several points below conventional rates through tax-
exempt industrial revenue bonds. This is negotiated between 
the applicant and a private lender and approved by the city 
and state agencies involved. The interest income to the 
lender is exempt from federal income taxes, and therefore 
the lender can offer terms more favorable than those availa-
ble on conventional loans. The applicant (through a bond 
counsel) determines if the project meets Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) size limits in order to be eligible for tax-
exempt financing: 
(1) When the bond issue is over $1 million, total 
capitalized expenditures cannot exceed $10 million 
over a six year period (three years before and 
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three years after the bond issuance date); 
(2) When the bond issue is $1 million or less, the 
total capital expenditures restriction stated 
above does not apply; 
(J) When the issue is for a project that has received 
an Urban Development Action Grant, the maximum 
capital expenditures limit is raised to $20 mil-
lion, but only $10 million of the bond issue will 
be tax -exempt. 
(4) When the bond issue is for pollution control, 
public garages, solid or liquid waste disposal, 
or certain other exempt facilities, there is no 
limit on the size of the bond issue or capital 
expenditures.2 
For mix ed-use projects, there are additional IRS regu-
lations: 
(1) Only renovation of an existing building, not new 
construction, is permitted. 
(2) Fifteen to twenty percent of the rental units 
must be for low to moderate income households. 
(J) No more than ten percent of the bond proceeds can 
go towards the commercial portion of the project, 
but each building must contain a commercial com-
ponent. 
A second incentive for enterprises includes mortgage 
insurance on rehabilitation of commercial buildings. This 
public assistance is limited to approximately $400,000 per 
project, and is administered by the Massachusetts Industrial 
Finance Agency. 
The third mechanism of the CARD program to attract 
private investment is through the Urban Job Incentive 
Program. This program, administered by the Massachusetts 
Department of Manpower Development, provides two forms of 
tax reduction: A credit against a corporation's state 
(79) 
excise tax liability; and a 25% payroll deduction. 
Communities committed to revitalizing their downtowns 
can, with an approved CARD plan, offer financial incentives 
to developers willing to invest in the CARD area. 
In order to be eligible for the program, the municipa-
lity must contain a commercial center with the following 
criteria: 
It must be an older established commercial center; 
and 
It must be experiencing commercial disinvestment. 
This includes a large vacancy rate in commercial 
buildings, loss of commercial sales, loss of 
significant retail businesses, or physically 
deteriorating commercial buildings. 
Once a community has pinpointed an area that poten-
tially qualifies, it must produce a CARD plan which contains 
the following components: 
(1) Rationale for designating the CARD. A statement 
describing existing economic development problems, 
clarified with data on market conditions over the 
past several years. 
(2) Plan Objectives. A description of how the problems 
in Section (1) will be addressed, and how existing 
commercial enterprises will be encouraged to remain 
in the CARD area. 
(J) CARD Boundaries. A description of the boundaries 
through a street and city map, and reasons for 
delineating those specified boundaries. 
(4) Land Use and Zoning of the district, through a 
description and a map. 
(5) Plan Strategy: 
(a) Public improvements and facilities to be pro-
vided. 
(b) Description of each project that could use 
the development incentives. 
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(c) General character of redevelopment, including 
its emphasis on expanding and attracting 
businesses. 
(d) Local financial committment, including issu-
ance of general obligation bonds and use of 
CDBG funds. 
(e) Compatibility with downtown development, so 
that the plan complements existing revitali-
zation strategies. 
(f) Land use and design controls, including 
signage, historic district designation, and 
design review. 
(g) Conformance with other local plans, including 
master plans, urban renewal plans and other 
pre-existing plans. 
(h) Business community participation, involving 
the plan formulation, marketing the plan, and 
knowledge of available incentives. 
(i) Local implementing agency's powers and ex-
perience. 
(j) Evidence of public hearing to inform citizens 
of the proposed CARD boundaries. 
(k) Additional documentation, including a resolu-
tion by the local governing body, a certifi-
cate by a recording officer attesting to the 
resolution, and an opinion by the Legislative 
Council that the plan is in accordance with 
all statutes and regulations. 
The draft CARD plan is then submitted to the Massachu-
setts Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD) 
for review. In order for the Secretary to approve the CARD 
plan, the following findings must be made: 
(1) That the boundaries describe a predominantly com-
mercial geographic area; 
(2) That the proposed CARD area is suffering from com-
mercial decay; 
(3) That the plan describes specific strategies 
designed to reverse the commercial decay, in-
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eluding public actions and the use of development 
incentives; 
That the local governing body of the municipality 
has approved the plan; 
That the business community was involved in plan-
ning the CARD; 
That a strategy has been designed to publicize 
and educate the business community concerning 
available development incentives; 
That the CARD plan takes into account any offi-
cially adopted local plan covering all or part of 
the CARD area; 
That a local agency has been identified with the 
capability to oversee implementation, and will be 
responsible and accountable for the marketing of 
the plan; 
That the local governing body has held a public 
hearing prior to approving the plan.3 
Approval of the CARD plan remains valid for two years. 
After that time, EOCD reviews the plan to determine if it 
should be renewed for an additional two years. This is 
dependent on: 
(1) The use of the development incentives to date; and 
(2) The extent to which the municipality has followed 
through on its committments to the CARD, including 
both public improvements and the strategy for in-
volving the business community. 
The important aspect of this program is that it en-
courages the targeting of all funding sources - public in-
frastructure, development incentives, and private capital -
into those areas that will benefit and need it the most. 
This philosophy counteracts the tendency to spread scarce 
resources too thinly, thus resulting in no one area achieving 
its maximum potential. The CARD program is a catalyst for 
(82) 
the rejuvenation of deteriorating city and town. centers 
across the state. It provides a unique approach to the 
alleviation of specific growth and development problems 
that are e xperienced not just in Massachusetts, but all 
over the United States. 
(SJ) 
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CHAPTER V: 
RESULTS OF THE CARD PROGRAM 
Intention of Survey 
The major goal of the CARD Program is to revitalize 
the decaying downtowns of city and town centers. In order 
to achieve this ~oal, it encourages the targeting of public 
and private resources into certain designated areas. One 
method that is used to attract business into these pre-
viously undesireable areas is the provision of tax-eYempt 
IRBs. This financial incentive offers lower interest 
rates than on conventional loans, and provides needed 
capital for the location of businesses. The attraction of 
a few sizeable firms into the district with IRBs, along 
with the provision of public infrastructure, are intended 
to act as catalysts for the revitalization of deteriorating 
centers. 
In order to determine whether the CARD Pro~ram is 
achieving. its stated goals in Massachusetts, a survey was 
conducted for collection of primary data. The information 
received is expected to answer the following questions: Is 
the CARD Program achieving its goal of revitalizing city 
and town centers? Are bonds a major tool in attracting 
firms to decaying downtowns? Do these firms act as cata-
lysts in revitalizing business districts? The answers to 
these questions will give a good indication of the current 
status of the program. The survey helps determine, in 
general, whether the prog.ram is successful or unsuccessful, 
from the viewpoints of the respondents surveyed. It also 
(87) 
pinpoints the program's strengths and weaknesses, and su~­
gest improvements for greater effectiveness. 
Methodology 
The type of survey design employed for the evaluation 
of the CARD Program was the mailed questionnaire. (See 
Appendix for a copy of the letter of explanation and the 
two-page questionnaire.) The population consisted of every 
district within the state with an approved CARD plan as of 
March 1982. 
Since some cities contained more than one district, a 
separate questionnaire for each district was sent to every 
city and town with at least one approved plan. The letter 
of explanation and questionnaire (s) were sent to those 
persons who wrote each of the plans. Names and addresses 
were obtained from the CARD files at the State Executive 
Office of Communities and Development (EOCD), and were 
assumed to be accurate. It was expected that the authors 
of the plans were the most knowledgeable about the back-
~round of the program, the problems encountered in carrying 
it out, and the prior conditions in the district. It is 
possible that the current situation was unknown if the 
author was no longer employed in that town, but it was 
assumed that the information could be easily obtained. The 
potential for systematic bias always e x ists, since those 
who completed the survey may have been those most informed 
or interested in the pro gram. It is reali zed that those 
who answered may have had the most information to report, 
(88) 
i.e., the greatest amount of activity in their districts. 
Thus it is possible that a proportionally greater amount of 
activity was reported than actually took place across the 
State. 
Strict confidentiality was assured, so as to obtain 
the most truthful answers and comments. Trends in the data 
across the state were to be determined, not case studies of 
individual towns. 
Open-ended questions and a comment section allowed for 
as much flexibility in the answers as possible. This left 
some discretion in the analysis, but most answers tended 
to follow a pattern and could be catagorized. Trends and 
causal effects were expected to become apparent in the 
analysis of the factual and attitudinal data received. 
General Information 
The Executive Office of Communities & Development 
(EOCD) began approving CARD plans at the end of 1978. 
Since that time, 93 cities have received plan approval, for 
a total of 153 districts. Table 3 gives a list of the 
cities and towns by population with the number of districts 
located within each. Map #1 presents the spatial distribu-
tion of the cities and towns with CARD plans. Table 4 
gives the number and percentage of districts according to 
the population of the city/town in which they are located. 
These figures are presented to be compared with the cities/ 
towns that answered the questionnaire. 
(89) 
TABLE 3 
CITIES AND TOWNS WITH APPROVED CARD PLANS 
1980 # of 1980 # of 
City/Town Popu- Dis- City/Town Popu- Dis-
lationa tricts lationa tricts 
Boston 563,000 20 * Bourne 14,000 1 
Springfield 152,000 7 * Brockton 98,000 1 
Cambridge 95,000 6 
* Canton 18,000 1 
* Brookline 55,900 5 * Chelsea 25,400 1 
* Quincy 84,500 5 Chicopee 55,100 1 
Newton 83,600 3 Clinton 12,800 1 
Northampton 29,300 3 * Danvers 24,000 1 
Arlington 48,200 2 
* Dracut 21, 200 1 
Beverly 37,600 2 Easton 16,600 1 
Everett 37,200 2 
* Fitchburg 39,000 1 
* Fall River 98,000 2 Framingham 65,100 1 
* Falmouth 23,600 2 Gardner 17,900 1 
Gt. Barrington 3,000 2 
* Georgetown 5,900 1 
Lawrence 63,100 2 
* Gloucester 26,000 1 
* Lowell 94,000 2 Greenfield 14,200 1 
Lynn 78,000 2 Haverhill 46,900 1 
* Melrose 30,000 2 Holyoke 44,700 1 
* Methuen 36,700 2 * Lee 6,400 1 
* New Bedford 98,500 2 Leominister 34,500 1 
Revere 42 ,400 2 Malden 53,400 1 
* Wareham 18,500 2 * Mansfield 14,000 1 
w. Springfield 27,000 2 Marlborough 30,600 1 
Abington 13,500 1 Marshfield 4,000 1 
* Adams 10,400 1 Medford 58,100 1 
* Amesbury 13,700 1 Middleboro 7,000 1 
Amherst 17,800 1 
* Milford 23,500 1 
Andover 8,400 1 
* Millbury 12,000 1 
* Athol 11,000 1 * Montague 8,000 1 
* Attleboro 34,500 1 * Natick 31J200 1 
* Ayer 6,800 1 Needham 27,900 1 
Barnstable 2,000 1 
* Newburyport 17,000 1 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
* 
* 
* 
City/Town 
N. Adams 
N. Andover 
N. Attleboro 
Oxford 
Palmer 
Peabody 
Pittsfield 
Plymouth 
Randolph 
Rockland 
Salem 
* Scituate 
Southbridge 
Stoneham 
Stoughton 
* Taunton 
Uxbridge 
Wakefield 
* Walpole 
* Waltham 
Ware 
Watertown 
* Webster 
Westfield 
Weymouth 
Whitman 
* Winchester 
* Woburn 
* Worcester 
1980 # of 
Popu- Dis-
lationa tricts 
18,000 
20,100 
21,000 
6,000 
4,000 
48,000 
52,000 
7,232 
28,200 
15,700 
38,200 
17,300 
12,900 
21,400 
26,700 
45,000 
8,400 
24,900 
18,500 
58,200 
6,800 
34,400 
14,500 
36,500 
55,600 
13,500 
22,000 
35,000 
162,000 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
' 
* Cities/towns that answered the questionnaire, and the popula-
tion that each reported. 
a U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Massachu-
setts, 1980. (Population of those cities/ towns that didn't 
answer the questionnaire.) 
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TABLE 4 
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DISTRICTS AND THOSE THAT RESPONDED TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
ACCORDING TO THE POPULATION OF THE CITY/TOWN IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED. 
Total # Of 
Population Districts 
Under · 10,000 15 
* 10 - 15,000 
* 15 - 20,000 
12 
11 
# Of Districts 
(Within That Pop. Cat. 
Total # Of Districts 
10% 
8% 
8% 
# Of Districts 
That Responded 
4 
7 
6 
# of Districts That 
Responded./ Total # 
Of Districts In That 
Pop. Catagory 
\.() 
\J\ 20 - J0,000 21 14% 
10% 
6% 
10 
27% 
58% 
55% 
48% 
40% 
25% 
64% 
JO - 40,000 
40 - 50,000 
* 50 - 60,000 
60 - 70,000 
70 - 80 ,000 
* 80 - 90,000 
* 90 - 100,000 
* Over 100,000 
Total 
15 
8 
11 
J 
6 
8 
12 
23 
145 
8% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
8% 
16% 
100% 
6 
2 
7 
0 
0 
5 
6 
16 
69 
0 
0 
6J% 
50% 
70% 
* Those population catagories in which information was received for at least 50% of the 
districts in that catagory. 
Analysis of Data 
Of the 93 cities/towns that comprised the population 
of the study, 42 returned the questionnaire. This is a 45% 
response rate. Of the possible 153 districts with active 
plans, data was received for 71 of them. This 46.4% re-
sponse rate is the more important of the two for this analy-
sis. This sample was considered to be a good representation 
of the cities and towns that contained districts. All 
percentages calculated and trends charted for the sample 
were assumed to be indicative of the program in general. 
Column 4 of Table 4 shows the percentage of districts 
for which data was received by population size of the cor-
responding city. (Question #2). Those districts for which 
data was received tended to be located in the larger cities 
(80,000+), but this is due in part to those cities having 
the greatest number of districts. Greater than 50% of the 
districts responded from towns with a population from 
10,000 - 20,000 each. Of those that answered the question-
naire, JO% had their plans approved before 1980, 38% were 
approved in 1980, and 32% were approved in 1981. (Question 
#7) (See Table 5). 
In order to put the data into perspective, it is 
important to know who the respondents were; 96% can be 
classified as city or town planners or planning officials, 
i.e., Planning Board chairmen, Redevelopment of Community 
Development officials, economic development specialists, 
etc. The remaining 4% were "others", i.e., Selectmen, 
( 9 6) 
TABLE 5 
YEARS WHEN PLANS WERE APPROVED 
Year Total # of % of Total # of Districts Total # That 
Approved Districts Districts That Responded Responded 
,,...... 1978 2 1% 1 1% 
'° --,,) 
1979 34 23% 19 29% 
1/80 - 6/80 31 21% 10 15% 
7/80 - 12/80 37 25% 15 23% 
1981 41 28% 21 32% 
1982* 3 2% 0 0 
Total 148 100% 66 100% 
*Plan approval as of March 1982. 
local Industrial Development Finance Authority officials. 
(Question #1). A reasonable assumption was made that these 
people were well-informed about activities in their locality . 
The type of commercial centers that were designated as 
CARDs were as follows: 56% were primary central business 
districts (CBDs), 30% were neighborhood commercial dis-
tricts, 10% were secondary CBDs, and 4% were considered to 
be "strip development" within larger cities. (Question #4). 
The questionnaire provided a table on which to list 
the businesses (by type) that exhibited "activity"; i.e., 
those that have moved into the district, expanded, or moved 
out since the plan was approved. Pertinent data that 
describes each business was requested. Thirty-seven percent 
(37%) of the districts reported no activity as of yet. 
Thirty-eight percent (38%) of these were recently approved 
(in 1981 or 1982), so it may have been too soon to evaluate 
the success of these districts. The other 62% which have 
had considerable time to attract businesses listed various 
reasons for no activity. 
Of the 63% that did report activity, a total of 107 
businesses, or 96%, have moved into the district or e x -
panded, and only 4% (five businesses) have moved out of the 
district. These ex isting firms were all small retail shops; 
i.e., clothing store, shoe store, camera shop, furniture 
store, pizza shop. These employed only a few people each. 
Of those that did locate or expand in the district, 79% 
were new businesses that moved in and 21% were already 
(98) 
located there, but expanded. 
Table 6 lists the types of businesses that located 
and expanded in the district, and the percentage of each. 
Since the questionnaire was open-ended, the respondents 
listed the types of businesses according to their own 
classification system. No standard definitions were pro-
vided, so these categories may not be mutually exclusive. 
Business/office buildings were represented the most, ac-
counting for 36% of all those who located in the districts. 
Other uses, i.e., banks, food and clothing stores, services, 
etc., ranged from three to nine percent each. 
The incentive used the most by businesses to locate 
or expand in the CARDs was the industrial revenue bond. 
SiYty-six percent (66%) of all 107 businesses used the 
advantage of tax-free interest on their loans. Table 7 
lists the types and percentages of businesses that used 
the bonds. Office buildings accounted for 53% of the bonds 
used, while banks accounted for 11%. Table 7 also gives 
the percentage that used bonds within each type of busi-
ness. For example, all (100%) of the retail malls, 
theaters, mi x ed use, and motels that located in districts 
used revenue bonds. Only 33% of the food stores, clothing 
stores, and restaurants used bonds. 
Of the 55 bonds that had cost figures attached, a 
total of $106,607,000 in bonds wa s reported. This averaged 
out to approximately $2 million p e r project. Five very 
larg e projects received bonds betwe en $7 and $10 million 
(99) 
TABLE 6 
TYPES OF BUSINESSES THAT LOCATED 
OR EXPANDED IN THE DISTRICT 
Type of Business Total # of 
Businesses 
Offices 40 
Banks 10 
Services 9 
Misc. Stores 8 
Food Stores 7 
Clothing Stores 6 
Medical 6 
Restaurants 6 
Misc. (School, Video) 6 
Theater/Museum 3 
Hotels 3 
Retail Malls 2 
Mixed Use 1 
Total 107 
(100) 
% of Total 
36% 
9% 
9% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
100% 
each. Six small projects used bonds between $150,000 and 
$250,000. 
Bonds were backed by other public financing in at least 
fourteen cases. Of the fourteen bonds supplemented, Urban 
Development Action Grants (UDAGs) were used for half of 
the projects. Table 8 lists the types of other financing 
by amount, and the corresponding IRB figure. 
Employment generated in downtowns with the help of the 
CARD program was a good indication of the program's success. 
It was possible to determine which businesses located in 
the district due in part to CARD incentives by coun~ing the 
number that used bonds. Employment figures were reported 
for 77 businesses, and they generated a total of 5784 jobs. 
Ninety-seven percent (97%) of these jobs were provided by 
the 59 firms that used bonds. That calculated out to be 
95 jobs per firm, as opposed to 10.6 jobs per firm for 
those that didn't use bonds. Obviously, firms that used 
bonds were large employers. 
Ownership status was reported for 70 businesses; 47% 
were corporations, 24% were individuals, 23% were partner-
ships, and 6% were non-profit corporations and trusts. 
Those firms that used bonds were 55% owned by corporations, 
34% by partnerships, 9% by non-profit corporations and 
trusts, and only 2% by individuals. This was contrasted 
by non-bond users, which were 62% individuals, 35% corpor-
ations, and 3% partnerships. The conclusion reached is 
that corporations tended to take advantage of bonds, and 
(101) 
TABLE 7 
TYPES OF BUSINESSES THAT USED BONDS 
# of 
# Of % Of Businesses 
Businesses Businesses Total That Used 
Type That Used That Used # Of Bonds 
Bonds Bonds Businesses Total # of 
Businesses 
Offices 37 53% 40 93% 
Banks 8 11% 10 80% 
Medical 5 7% 6 83% 
Services 5 7% 9 56% 
Theaters 3 4% 3 100% 
Retail Mall 2 4% 2 100% 
Food Stores 2 3% 7 29% 
Clothing Stores 2 3% 6 33% 
Hotels 3 3% 3 100% 
Restaurants 2 3% 6 33% 
Mixed Use 1 1% 1 100% 
Total 70 100% 93 100% 
TABLE 8 
TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF OTHER FINANCING 
Other Financing # Of Amount Amount 
Catagories Projects Of Bonds 
UDAG 7 $13,994,ooo $36,434,000 
Private 3 8,800,000 11,500,000 
Urban Renewal Funds 1 181,000 213,000 
312 Loans 1 100,000 400,000 
CDBG 2 80,000 470,000 
Total 14 $22,155,000 $49,017,000 
( 102) 
individually-owned firms tended not to. 
When asked if the respondent thought that the business-
es would have located in the district without the subsidy, 
68% thought that it probably would not have. (Question #4). 
Sixty-seven percent (67%) of all 107 businesses rehabi-
litated older buildings in the district and 33% constructed 
new buildings. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the businesses 
that used bonds rehabilitated buildings. (Question #5). 
Twenty-one percent (21%) of the CARDs were partially 
or entirely located in a National Register Historic District. 
Eleven firms were reported as having considered another 
site for location. (Question #5). Of these, nine used 
bonds to locate in the district. Four contemplated another 
town, three were interested in the strip development nearby, 
two considered other sites in town, and one each considered 
the suburban shopping mall and the intersection of two 
major highways. 
Forty-one percent (41%) of the CARDs reported "strip 
development" nearby. (Question #10). Seventy-six percent 
(76%) of these strips have stayed the same, and 24% have 
expanded. (Question #11). Of those strip developments 
that expanded, all the CARDs in the vicinity reported a 
decrease in their vacancy rate. (Question #9). 
When asked if parking had become strained in the dis-
trict since approval, 58% said no, 18% - yes, 11% - always 
has been, 9% - same, and 4% - yes, but more parking is 
being provided. (Question #16). 
(103) 
Seventy-three percent (7J%) of the districts reported 
the provision of public infrastructure. (Question #17). 
Twenty-three percent (2J%) of this was the upgrading of 
streets, 19% was for parking, 19% for sewers, 11% for side-
walks, 9% for water mains, 8% for landscaping, 6% for light-
ing, and 5% for traffic improvements. Forty-six percent 
(46%) of the funding for this infrastructure was Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) money; 15% was from local 
funds; 15% was from UDAGs; 8% was from state funds; 8% 
was from Economic Development Administration (EDA) funds; 
and 8% was from the Urban Systems program. (Question #17). 
When asked who initiated the idea to establish a 
district, the breakdown was reported as follows: 46% by 
the city/town, 22% by the planning department, 1J% by 
businesses, 7% by both the city and businesses, 6% by both 
the planning department and businesses, and 6% by both the 
planning department and the city/town. (Question #12). 
Of the businesses that requested the plan, half of them 
eventually located in the district using a revenue bond. 
(Question #lJ). 
The vacancy rate in 82% of the districts had stayed 
the same since plan approval. No districts had shown an 
increase, and 18% had decreased their vacancy rates. This 
drop was significant, at an average of 41% per district. 
Before plan approval, the average vacancy rate was 11.7%, 
as opposed to 8.J% afterward. (Question #9). 
Eighty-three percent (8J%) of the respondents felt 
(104) 
that there had been at least some visible improvement in 
the district since the CARD program was initiated. (Ques-
tion #18). Seventy-eight percent (78%) said property 
values had increased in the district (Question #19), and 
86% said that the tax base had increased. (Question #20). 
It was not possible to determine how much the CARD Program 
had e x clusively contributed to this revitalization, since 
other efforts and market forces may have been working in 
combination with CARD. However, only 22% of the respondents 
felt that the district would have been revitalized without 
the program. Twenty-four percent (24%) envisioned revita-
lization eventually, but they felt that it would not have 
occurred so soon or as quickly without CARD. (Question #21). 
Question #22 requested a description of the problems 
that the respondent had experienced with the program. 
' Thirty-three percent (33%) claimed that they had no problems 
whatsoever with the program. Thirty-six percent (36%) of 
questionnaires received explicitely stated that the major 
problem with the program was that the use of the IRB incen-
tive was restricted to large firms. The cost of the bond 
counsel was prohibitively high, and made the issuance of 
bonds under $200,000 unprofitable. EOCD is currently work-
ing on a solution to this problem, which is considered to 
be the major flaw in the program. It consists of a provi-
s ion for "umbrella loans", in which a number of projects 
can each get a s eparate loan, but share one bond and one 
bond couns el. This would reduce the processing costs, and 
( 105) 
make smaller loans feasible. The bonding process discrimi-
nates against smaller towns who have trouble attracting 
the larger enterprises that tend to use the bonds. There-
fore most towns don't receive the full range of intended 
benefits from the program. But the problem is not restric-
ted to the small towns. One-half of Boston's twenty dis-
tricts have had no bonding activity. These are all neigh-
borhood commercial districts that have attracted projects 
with development costs under $250,000. The bond council 
would cost $20,000 each, so in the long run it is not a 
profitable deal. One respondent suggested that the revenue 
bonds be supplemented with a special provision in the dis-
trict for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans. 
Eight percent found that banks were not interested in 
issuing the revenue bonds. A few other problems were stated 
once or twice, such as the bond's interest rate is still too 
high for many firms to borrow money at, the packaging of the 
bonds was difficult, and obtaining financing was difficult 
for firms even if the plan was in place. 
Trends in the Program 
The analysis of this data and the results of various 
cross tabulation:> present important implications concerning 
the CARD Program. The program is generally attracting 
businesses from out of the area to locate in the district, 
and is encouraging the expansion of existing firms somewhat. 
Very few businesses have been forced out, with the aggregate 
result being a net increase in businesses. This is one in-
(106) 
dication that the districts are being revitalized. Most of 
the businesses that locate in the districts used revenue 
bonds. These firms tend to be large, labor intensive, 
corporate-owned offices that have rehabilitated existing 
buildings for occupancy. The bonds were successful in re-
distributing firms from what are often thought of as more 
desireable areas to these decaying downtowns. This indi-
cates that the bond incentive is extremely important for 
the proper functioning of the CARD program. The bonds have 
contributed to the revitalization of the city and town 
centers by attracting large businesses that provide new 
employment for the area. These firms serve as the critical 
anchor that is crucial in any revitalization effort. They 
provide spinoff benefits to the district and make it less 
risky for smaller firms to locate nearby. It overcomes 
the "prisoner's dilemma", (see page114) which is a persis-
tent problem in less desireable areas. 
In addition to private firms contributing to the 
district, almost all of the towns are displaying their 
committment to the area through the provision of public 
infrastructure, and the targeting of funds. Most of the 
cities/towns initiated the process to produce a plan, 
which highlights the "decaying" district as the focus for 
the town's revitalization efforts. 
The combination of public and private committments to 
designated areas is the surest way to achieve the goals of 
the CARD Program. The statistics show that vacancy rates 
(107) 
have dropped substantially in certain districts, and that 
property values and the tax rates have increased in most 
districts. A consensus has emerged that the CARDs show a 
definite visible improvement since inception. 
Thus, the three questions posed at the beginning of 
this chapter can be answered in the affirmative. The CARD 
Program is achieving its goal of revitalizing city and town 
centers; bonds are a major tool in attracting firms to 
decaying downtowns; and these firms are acting as catalysts 
in revitalizing the commercial districts. 
Comments received on the questionnaires highlight the 
localities' confidence in the program. (Question #23). A 
number of the respondents stated that CARD was the key to 
their revitalization efforts. It is a successful tool in 
rejuvenating their decaying downtowns, and has brought 
life back into their dying community. Many feel that it is 
a superior program that can promote an area's full potential 
when used in combination with other tools. The program has 
opened communication between the public and private sectors, 
and a working relationship has been established through the 
CARD Program. This is a valuable outcome that will per-
petuate and add to the success of future endeavors . 
The concept of the CARD Program has been transformed 
into reality in Massachus etts. Concrete res ults are quan-
tifiable, and the program can be adequately evaluated. With 
this information presented, a conclusion can be reached 
concerning the value of revenue bonds when u s ed in specific 
(108) 
situations. 
( 109) 
Bocart, Paul. 
chusetts. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
CONCLUSION 
Does The CARD Program Justify The Use Of IRBs? 
Chapter II highlights the controversial nature of IRBs, 
and outlines some of the major problems that exist in their 
continued use. These assertions are justified when directed 
at the IRB legislation in general. But these negative 
reports have failed to consider alternative ways of using 
IRBs. They take the narrow viewpoint that IRBs are generally 
not working, and therefore have no justifiable use and should 
be completely eliminated. This paper attempts to move beyond 
this stunted analysis by evaluating a targeting program that 
incorporates revenue bonds into its functioning. A reitera-
tion of the fundamental shortcomings of IRBs is posed, and 
the CARD Program's response to these is presented. 
A major contention is that bonds do not affect firms' 
' location decisions because they are available in almost 
every state of the Union. The original intent of the legis-
lation has been disguised, resulting in a solution that 
does not attend to the problem. The CARD Program however, 
requires businesses to locate in a certain designated area 
in order to receive the subsidy. Targeting assures that 
the bond will benefit distressed areas. Moreover, evidence 
shows that almost all of the firms who chose the district 
over an alternative location used revenue bonds. 
Currently, the . federal IRB legislation allows a firm 
to locate anywhere and receive the subsidy. This includes 
affluent, high employment communities in which the firm 
(112) 
would have located anyway. The CARD Program affects loca-
tion decisions on an intra-regional level, or more precise-
ly, an intra-city level. This means that businesses will 
be redistributed from the prosperous strip development and 
suburban shopping malls (where demand for space often tends 
to eYceed the supply) into the older downtown commercial 
centers (where the supply of space generally exceeds the 
demand). Firms need to see that the city is committed to 
the downtown area, by improving on the existing infra-
structure and channeling available funding into that area. 
The incentive makes the downtown location more attractive 
by reducing the risk involved. 
The Investment Bankers Association (IBA) contends that 
the issuance of revenue bonds is getting out of hand, and 
some measure should be taken to restrict their use. This 
is eyactly what the CARD Program does ; it realizes that 
bonds as incentives are not properly used in many cases, 
so it limits them to specific areas where they will be 
advantageously utilized. 
The long-standing argument over what constitutes a 
"public purpose" continues to be debated. IRBs use public 
funds to subsidize businesses, so it is deduced that 
federal taxes are aiding private enterprise. The problem 
with this argument is that the ultimate goal of the subsidy 
is being overlooked. It is true that public money is being 
transferred to the private sector, but this is not meant to 
be the end result. These subsidi zed firms in turn are 
( 113) 
expected to provide jobs to these unemployment areas, which 
will eventually create spinoffs i.e., complementary bus-
inesses, that lead to revitalization of the whole area. 
Many argue that if a business uses a bond to locate in a 
previously prosperous area in which market forces are work-
ing favorably, then the bond is not being used for its 
intended purpose. The CARD Program dispels this argument 
by designating the neediest areas, and directing bonds to 
commercial centers that will benefit the most. The provi-
sion of jobs and upgrading of a city/town constitutes a 
public purpose that is the responsibility of the whole 
nation. 
Others point out the inequity that results from only 
certain firms receiving IRBs. Businesses in the area that 
don't receive the subsidy are discriminated against, and 
it upsets market competition. This is true if the subsi-
dized firm is a direct competitor of an existing firm. But 
the CARD Program is sensitive to this by not approving a 
bond when there is a competing firm nearby which is pros-
pering. In addition, many of the districts are initially 
risky areas where few single firms would consider locating 
in isolation. However, if all businesses at the same time 
agreed to locate in the district, then no subsidy would be 
needed to revitalize the area. In reality this never 
happens , and is known as the "prisoner's dilemma". This 
means that the first few businesses to enter a distressed 
area require an advantage to overcome the prisoner's 
( 114) 
dilemma. Once this process is begun and spinoffs are 
created, the area is no longer distressed and should lose 
its CARD designation. 
Economists say that redistributing firms by providing 
subsidies leads to inferior resource allocation. Firms 
will not be as efficient in the forced location as in the 
area that would be chosen according to market mechanisms 
because they would not be max imizing their cost/benefit 
ratio. This means that there would be reduced national 
productivity and a lower gross national product (GNP). 
But businesses are only concerned with their own expendi-
tures when they choose a location. They don't consider 
the money the government must spend so that they can locate 
wherever the market steers them. They take for granted 
the provision of infrastructure which the government often 
automatically provides according to the whims of business. 
The government goes deeper into debt and tax es are raised 
each time new infrastructure must be provided. In addition, 
environmental considerations are often neglected by busi-
ness. Haphazard growth involves hidden costs that must 
be addressed eventually. Our scarce natural resources 
must be protected by government through the promotion of 
concentration of growth. Business profit-maximization 
decisions may be wasting valuable resources, because only 
one side of the picture is looked at. Market location 
decisions may be efficient for business in the short run, 
but may not be in the b est int erests of the nation in the 
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long run. The Massachusetts CARD Program was designed to 
capitalize on existing infrastructure in established city 
and town centers. It is inefficient from the national 
point of view to abandon useable infrastructure or to spend 
more money providing it somewhere else. In addition, 
established cities and towns each posess a unique character 
that deserve to be maintained. The costs of sprawl are too 
easily overlooked, and should be checked by controlling and 
targeting growth into eYisting city and town centers, the 
chief goal of the Massachusetts Growth Policy. 
Thus the CARD Program's goals present a sound approach 
to growth policy. Most of the shortcomings of the present 
IRB legislation are eliminated when applied to the CARD 
philosophy. In order to determine whether the use of bonds 
in this capacity is justified, the success of the CARD 
Program in achieving its goals must be proven. In addition, 
bonds must be an integral part of this success. Chapter V 
confirms the success of the program with the use of IRBs, 
by presenting empirical data. In general, districts show 
signs of visible improvement since the inception of the 
CARD Program. This revitalization would not be possible 
without the availability of IRBs. Thus, through success-
fully achieving its goal of revitalization, the CARD Pro-
gram presents a justifiable and beneficial use for indus-
trial revenu e bonds. 
Recommendations 
The Federal government has seriously considered the 
complet e e limination of industrial r evenue bonds. This is 
(116) 
due to the tremendous loss of money to the federal treasury, 
and the extensive publicity covering the eYploitive use of 
bonds by large profitable companies. 
The repeal of all industrial revenue bonds means that 
the CARD Program will lose its major implementing device. 
This is illogical since the program is successful and dis-
pels most of the problems facing bonds. Proponents ob-
viously have not examined all the facets of IRBs and their 
potential. If they had, they may have realized that it is 
not an "all or nothing" decision. IRB legislation should 
be reassessed in terms of the variations that e x ist for 
their use. 
General IRB legislation for bus ines s enterprises is 
responding to old problems. Their use began in the 1930s 
in response to inequalities caused by the Industrial Revo-
lution. These problems are no longer occurring in the 
same form. New problems have emerged, and we are still 
using an old remedy that was not designed for our current 
situation. This is why the legislation must be rethought 
and manipulated to respond to today's world. The economy 
of the Northeast and the role of cities in general are 
being transformed from that of production centers into 
service centers . This evolutionary process cannot and 
should not be disputed. Rather, programs should respond 
to this changing structure by promoting the s ervice industry 
in city and town centers. This should be undertaken not 
just in the booming regions. A balance must be reached 
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for equity across the U.S. Since the CARD Program uses 
bonds for this purpose, it has found a way to employ the 
subsidy for current needs. Targeting bonds to specific 
areas and for specific purposes is the key to their success-
ful future. 
Additional research into this area is necessary before 
any amendments could even be sug~ested. IRBs have been 
selectively used in various ways in a few regions in addi-
tion to Massachusetts, i.e., Erie County, New York; New 
Jersey metropolitan areas; Portsmouth, Oregon. However, 
the Massachusetts program appears to be the most sophisti-
cated and structured approach. The other methods should 
be evaluated also, to extract any successful variations 
for the improvement of the CARD philosophy. The foundation 
exists for bonds to be fine-tuned to serve a useful purpose 
again. A concerted effort must be undertaken to refine 
and polish the functioning of the CARD Program with the 
use of IRBs, so that it can act as a model for all the 
states in the Union to follow. 
(118) 
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APPENDIX 
re: CARD Plan 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
Department of Community Planning 
36 Upper College Road 
University of Rhode Island 
Kingston, RI 02881 
March 5 , 19 8 2 
I am currently a second-year graduate student in the Department 
of Community Planning and Area Development at the University of 
Rhode Island. This questionaire is an integral part of my Master's 
thesis project, entitled, "An Evaluation of the Massachusett's Com-
mercial Area Revitalization District P.rogram." Each individual or 
group throughout Massachusetts who wrote a CARD plan will receive 
this questionaire, and I am hoping to obtain as close to a 100% re-
turn as possible. If you are not the aforementioned party, please 
forward this to the author of the plan. 
You can be assured that your responses will remain completely 
confidential. This data in no way will be disaggregated by town; 
I am looking for trends in the data for the State as a whole. I 
have been in contact with, although not commissioned by, Mr. Ed Man-
gini from the Executive Office of Communities and Development. He 
will review this report upon completion in May of 1982. 
It would be greatly appreciated if you would complete one 
questionaire for each district _ in your community, and return it 
promptly to the above address. If you have any questions whatsoever, 
please feel free to contact me at home (401-789-1455), or leave a 
message at my office (401-792-2248) and I will get back to you 
shortly. Thank you very much for your time and effort. 
Sincerely, 
Jeanmarie Miller 
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6. Is the CARD in a National Register Historic District? 
7. When was the CARD plan approved? 
8. Date plan was renewed: Renewal not requested: 
9. Vacancy rate in district prior to plan approval: Currently: 
.0. Is there an established "strip development" within a few miles of the 
district that contains the same types of businesses? 
.1. Has this expanded, declined, or stayed the same since approval? 
.2. Who initiated the idea to establish a CARD district (i.e., town, business, 
Chamber of Commerce, etc.)? 
.3. If a single business requested the plan, has it located in the district 
using a revenue bond? 
.4. Do you think the business would have located in the district without the 
subsidy? 
.5. Are there similar market areas nearby where the business could have 
located? 
.6. Has parking in the district become strained since approval? 
.7. What types of infrastructure has the city provided in the district, and 
how was it funded? 
L8. Is there a visible improvement in the district since approval? 
.9. Have property values generally increased in the district? 
'.O. Do you feel that the tax base has increased in the town? 
'.1. Do you think the revitalization of this commercial district would have 
taken place in the near future without the program? 
'.2. What problems have you experienced with the program? 
'.3. Other comments: (Attach an additional sheet if necessary) 
